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Preface 
  
 A few years ago I sat in class listening to my professor explain how the federal nature of 
American government made it difficult for the United States to ratify the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child.  Until that point, I had been one of the many who chalked that up to 
American arrogance – even though I would define myself as a proud American and a generally 
freethinking political science student.  I held this mistaken view because it was what surrounded 
me, in the views of many of those around me and in the mass media.  The lecture was eye 
opening and forced me to reevaluate how I felt about the United States’ treaty ratification.  
Shortly afterward I began an internship in British Parliament that opened my eyes to the effects 
treaty ratification can have on a country without a codified constitution.  Soon I was considering 
what other domestic characteristics played into treaty ratification, and I began to understand that 
there is much more to ratification than simple support of the treaty’s provisions. 
 I myself have been one of those people who criticized the United States’ failure to ratify 
important multilateral treaties.  Like many others, I fell prey to the easy explanation of 
hegemonic arrogance, until someone suggested a different view.  Through my work I want to 
help others begin to consider alternative explanations in hopes that they, like I, reconsider their 
position on the American outlier effect.  
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Abstract 
 
 Failure to ratify some international treaties is often cited as evidence that the United 
States arrogantly believes that it is exempt from international laws.  This view is damaging to the 
United States’ international reputation and does not address the various reasons that the United 
States has not ratified treaties.  Rather than a result of arrogance, lack of ratification is more 
frequently the result of domestic constraints found in the United States – domestic constraints 
which can be summarized by the concept of American exceptionalism.  The core tenant of 
American exceptionalism is that the United States is different from most other countries due to 
its historical, institutional, and cultural characteristics.  This paper explores the application of 
American exceptionalism to treaty ratification and shows that the United States faces many 
obstacles in the ratification process that are unrelated to the hegemonic arrogance of which it is 
accused. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Treaty ratification is viewed as a way to demonstrate a desire to cooperate internationally 
and comply with international regulations and norms.  When the United States does not ratify 
major, multilateral treaties this is often perceived as a lack of concern for those international 
norms.  This is translated into an explanation of American arrogance for the American outlier 
effect.1 Essentially, the criticism is that the United States believes that its hegemonic role in 
world affairs affords it the ability to ignore those rules it does not wish to recognize.   
 While the path to that explanation is clear, the explanation itself leaves much to be 
desired.  It ignores many other possible factors responsible for lack of treaty ratification and 
instead assumes the popular position of criticizing world leaders.  The main aspect of treaty 
ratification this theory ignores is that of domestic constraints.  Domestic characteristics create the 
environment for ratification, because while treaties are negotiated internationally they must be 
ratified domestically.  While this is a simple concept, it is overlooked by the theory of American 
arrogance.  Therefore, it is necessary to examine not only international but also domestic 
qualities when evaluating treaty ratification. 
 The concept of American exceptionalism explains the domestic constraints in the United 
States.  American exceptionalism is the idea that the United States is different from other 
countries, and it explains these differences as institutional, cultural, and historical qualities.  The 
concept is relatively simple – the United States has been different from other major countries 
from its inception.  Those who lived in the New World were often searching for freedom and 
opportunities they could not find in their homeland.  Because of this, they shaped a country very 
                                                             
1 For the purpose of this paper, the American outlier effect refers to the fact that the United States ratifies 
multilateral treaties less frequently than other developed nations. 
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different from those of the Old World.  For centuries, scholars and intellectuals have studied and 
considered this phenomenon, intrigued by the differences of the New World.   
 Today the concept of American exceptionalism can also provide a concrete theory of the 
domestic constraints on treaty ratification in the United States.  The American outlier effect in 
treaty ratification exists because the United States is an outlier, or an exception, historically, 
culturally, and institutionally.  These differences increase the difficulties of treaty ratification in 
the United States.   
 This paper will explore the effect of American exceptionalism in the following order.  
Chapter two is a literature review ranging from the origins and necessity of treaty ratification to 
specific treaty powers and domestic constraints in the United States and other countries.  Chapter 
three will give further background on the popular criticism of U.S. failure to ratify and the 
specifics of the ratification process in the United States.  Chapter four explains the concept of 
American exceptionalism in depth.  Chapter five covers analysis of the treaties the United States 
has not ratified.  Chapter six includes the treaties that the United States has ratified and explores 
the differences and similarities between ratified and unratified treaties.  Chapter seven examines 
one ratified treaty, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and one 
unratified treaty, the Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes 
and their Disposal, to ascertain what led to the latter’s lack of ratification. 
2.  Literature Review 
 
 The idea of negotiating and implementing treaties has long been debated.  Though there 
is a great deal of literature on ratification and the necessity of ratification, the literature on the 
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United States’ ratification of treaties focuses mainly on criticizing the United States’ failure to 
ratify treaties, leaving a gap where explanation of this failure should be.  This gap is what I will 
explore in the following chapters.  This chapter continues as follows: section one examines the 
idea of conflict termination with treaties.  Section two explores ratification in general.  Section 
three focuses on ratification in the United States.  Section four elaborates on the issues 
surrounding ratification in other countries. 
2.1 Conflict Termination   
 
 In order for conflict termination to be successful, several aspects must be calculated into 
the end product.  Any international agreement must take into account both the domestic and 
international domains.1 As negotiations mainly take place in the international arena, it is 
incredibly important to remember domestic factors because they may not be obvious during 
negotiations.  There is tension between international and domestic views of the balance of power 
between the two domains.  The international view is that international laws are the supreme law 
of the world and domestic constitutions are merely facts.  However, each country sees its own 
laws and constitution as the absolute law, and strong countries believe that international law does 
not have the power to constrain domestic law.2 “Variance in state preferences is almost entirely 
due to difference in domestic arrangements” and therefore it is incredibly important to consider 
domestic constraints during international negotiations.3 "The domestic process of ratification and 
the concentration of social interests influence international bargaining processes" and this 
                                                             
1 Nathalie J. Frensley. “Ratification Processes and Conflict Termination.” Journal of Peace Research 35.2 (1998): 
167-191. 
2 Edward T. Swaine. “Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?” Columbia Law Review 103.3 (2003): 403-533. 
3 Peter B. Evans, Harold Karan Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam. Double-edged Diplomacy: International 
Bargaining and Domestic Politics. Berkeley: University of California, 1993. 12. 
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determines the win-set of ratifiable agreements for each individual country.1 The international 
domain sometimes discounts the importance of domestic institutions and public opinion, which 
is a mistake.  Domestic constraints have a large impact on a country’s international negotiations 
because, while the world is more united than ever, it is still comprised of roughly two hundred 
individual countries.   
Domestic constraints must be considered because treaties, while primarily international, 
have a large effect on internal issues and require domestic enforcement.  It is not possible for 
treaties to only be relevant in the international realm.  Additionally, today treaties often govern 
domestic issues, which increases the likelihood of overlap and conflict with domestic law.2 
Treaties like the human rights treaties greatly affect internal matters and require domestic 
enforcement of rights such as the right to work, right to strike, right to just and favorable 
conditions of work, right to association, right to social security, right to family support, right to 
an adequate standard of education and right to participation in one’s own culture.3 While most of 
these rights are recognized in developed democracies, all countries that ratify the United 
Nation’s Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, for instance, must take care that 
these rights are enforceable through domestic law.  Treaties have soft law characteristics, which 
makes them essentially unenforceable through traditional means.4 This requires states to provide 
domestic interpretation of the treaty and to develop new ways to enforce the terms.  This may 
cause “states with robust domestic rule of law” to “shy away from committing to international 
                                                             
1 Peter B. Evans, Harold Karan Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam. Double-edged Diplomacy: International 
Bargaining and Domestic Politics. 33. 
2 Curtis A. Bradley. “The Treaty Power and American Federalism.” Michigan Law Review 97.2 (1998): 390-461.  
3 Clarence Clyde Ferguson. “The United Nations Human Rights Covenants: Problems of Ratification and 
Implementation.” Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at Its Annual Meeting (1921-
1969) 62 (1968): 83-96.  
4 Oona A. Hathaway. “Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 
51.4 (2007): 588-621. 
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treaties” because it would be incredibly difficult to incorporate the treaty into the existing 
statutes.1  
Domestic institutions, law, and politics have a large impact on which treaties a country is 
able to ratify.  Some countries have very complicated ratification processes intended to slow 
ratification or limit the amount of time that can be spent on the ratification procedure.  For 
example, in order to approve the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty, Ireland, Finland, Austria 
and France had to write constitutional amendments; Ireland and Denmark had to hold popular 
referendums; and Finland, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg and Sweden all required a qualified 
majority vote in parliament.2 Japan, another country with complicated ratification, has a 
“confusingly pluralist” political system that draws out the ratification process.3 The emphasis in 
Japan is on consensus, not majority rule, and there are only about 150 days in the legislative 
calendar, around 60 of which are dedicated to the budget.4 Because the government of Japan is 
incredibly limited in its ability to ratify treaties, the process is long.  Regarding domestic laws, a 
country’s ability to ratify a treaty could be constrained by its constitutional law.  For instance, the 
human rights covenants disallow speech that incites national, racial, or religious hatred, but this 
directly contradicts the right to free speech under the Constitution of the United States.5 
Additionally, some nations may hold moral contention with approaching certain issues from a 
legal standpoint rather than an educational or socialization aspect.  Ferguson questions if the 
                                                             
1 Oona A. Hathaway. “Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?” 612. 
2 Simon Hug and Thomas König. “In View of Ratification: Governmental Preferences and Domestic Constraints at 
the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference.” International Organization 56.2 (2002): 447-476.  
3 Joseph Frankel. “Domestic Politics of Japan's Foreign Policy: A Case Study of the Ratification of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty.” British Journal of International Studies 3.3 (1977): 254-268. 262. 
4 Joseph Frankel. “Domestic Politics of Japan's Foreign Policy: A Case Study of the Ratification of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty.” 
5 Clarence Clyde Ferguson. “The United Nations Human Rights Covenants: Problems of Ratification and 
Implementation.” 
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correct approach to human rights is really through a law or if it is better accomplish in some 
other way.1  
 Domestic politics can also impede treaty ratification.  Evans calls domestic politics the 
“imperfection” that prohibits purely rational actions in the international sphere.2  The political 
process, independent of institutions, can slow down the ratification process, as has often 
happened with the lengthy discussion of the United Nations human rights covenants in the 
United States.3 If a country’s politics requires extensive work and hearings to discuss the treaty 
at length before the ratification process can begin, this can lead to stagnation of the issue and 
legislators will either choose to move on or be forced to move on by the necessity of discussing 
other issues.4 One remedy for stagnation Lillich suggests is to essentially publicize the treaty and 
publically push for ratification.  Interested organizations must coordinate efforts to push for 
ratification while communicating officially and informally with the responsible administration.5 
Domestic politics have been impeding ratification since at least the mid-19th century.  In Japan 
between 1853 and 1868 there was serious political conflict over a trade agreement with Western 
powers.  The Shogun, or secular leader, had absolute treaty power but customarily consulted 
with the Mikado, the spiritual leader.  When the Mikado opposed the agreement with the West, 
the Shogun ignored his advice and continued anyway.  Over several years the two struggled to 
gain control of the issue and though the Shogun eventually won, his position lost a great deal of 
                                                             
1 Clarence Clyde Ferguson. “The United Nations Human Rights Covenants: Problems of Ratification and 
Implementation.” 
2 Peter B. Evans, Harold Karan Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam. Double-edged Diplomacy: International 
Bargaining and Domestic Politics. 9. 
3 Richard B. Lillich. “U.S. Ratification of the Human Rights Covenants: Now or Ever?” Proceedings of the Annual 
Meeting (American Society of International Law) 80 (1986): 419-421. 
4 Richard B. Lillich. “U.S. Ratification of the Human Rights Covenants: Now or Ever?” 
5 Richard B. Lillich. “U.S. Ratification of the Human Rights Covenants: Now or Ever?” 
12 
 
power and reputation in the process.1 Though the internal struggle over ratification may not be as 
dramatic as it was in 19th century Japan, the same issues often affect the feasibility of treaty 
ratification today.   
The domestic population’s public opinion of the treaty must also be considered during 
negotiations.  Public opinion can have a serious effect on both the process and result of 
international bargaining if the public and ratifying actors disagree, the issue is salient to the 
public, and the public has an indirect or direct ratifying power.2 Direct ratifying power usually 
involves a popular referendum.  Indirect ratifying power is the likelihood that the issue will be 
important in an election and because of this it is generally acknowledged that treaties should be 
acceptable to the domestic population.3 Otherwise, the collateral consequences can be disastrous 
either for the treaty, the government, or the political actors involved in ratification.4 This can be a 
problem when the population is divided in its support or does not wish for the government to 
involve itself in an international problem, a concept known as the entry problem.  “Elites respond 
to the entry problem by refusing to engage in negotiations or by trying to convince their 
constituents that their primary interests are best promoted by ending the conflict.”5 The median 
voter of the population plays a central role in conflict termination.  How the median voter will 
act depends on the character of the population and the median voter’s preference.6 If the 
population is fairly homogenous, there will be no ratification requirement because the 
negotiators will hold the same values as the voters.  This is a rare circumstance because most 
                                                             
1 Payson J. Treat. “The Mikado's Ratification of the Foreign Treaties.” The American Historical Review 23.3 (1918): 
531-549.  
2 Peter F. Trumbore. “Electoral Politics as Domestic Ratification in International Negotiations: Insights from the 
Anglo-Irish Peace Process.” Irish Studies in International Affairs 12 (2001): 113-131. 
3 Peter F. Trumbore. “Electoral Politics as Domestic Ratification in International Negotiations: Insights from the 
Anglo-Irish Peace Process.”; Nathalie J. Frensley. “Ratification Processes and Conflict Termination.” 
4 Oona A. Hathaway. “Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?” 
5 Nathalie J. Frensley. “Ratification Processes and Conflict Termination.” 171. 
6 Hans Haller and Steinar Holden. “Ratification Requirement and Bargaining Power.” International Economic 
Review 38.4 (1997): 825-851.  
13 
 
populations are not homogenous in their political beliefs.  If the population is heterogeneous, 
which is much more likely, the median voter’s preference will dictate the ratification 
requirement.  If he has a low reservation utility, meaning he would like there to be any 
resolution, he will prefer a simple majority vote.  However, if he has a high reservation utility, 
meaning he will only accept a few possible resolutions, he will require a supermajority vote.1  
While it may seem like domestic constraints could easily overwhelm international cooperation, 
Hug and König present the belief that if domestic constraints are factored into the negotiations, 
the people will take little notice of the result.  Research in this area has been limited to the 
application of the theory to the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Convention, but it could be 
possible to broaden this idea to future deliberations as well.2  
There are many cases in which public opinion had an influence on negotiations and 
ratification.  As an example, Trumbore explains the difference between British and Irish 
ratification power as it applied to the Anglo-Irish peace process at the end of the 20th century.  
The Irish, unlike the British, have a direct ratification power because constitutional changes in 
Ireland require a popular referendum.  Neither country, however, had an indirect ratification 
power because the populations of both countries did not hold the peace process as an important 
electoral issue.  Therefore, public opinion in Ireland had a stronger effect on the negotiations 
than public opinion in Britain, due to the direct ratification power.3 Divided public opinion 
impeded ratification in Japan during Japanese ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and as 
                                                             
1 Hans Haller and Steinar Holden. “Ratification Requirement and Bargaining Power.” 
2 Simon Hug and Thomas König. “In View of Ratification: Governmental Preferences and Domestic Constraints at 
the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference.” 
3 Peter F. Trumbore. “Electoral Politics as Domestic Ratification in International Negotiations: Insights from the 
Anglo-Irish Peace Process.”  
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it was impossible for the government to satisfy both sides, the ratification process was 
protracted.1  
Nigerian ratification of the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Agreement is a good example of the 
negative consequences of negotiating a treaty against the public’s will.  The Nigerian people 
were outraged that the government had agreed to allow the British army to establish bases in 
Nigeria.2 The outcry against the agreement succeeded in removing the clauses about British 
bases before ratification of the agreement.  The agreement narrowly passed and in fact only 
passed because the country had a North-South ideological cleavage and the North, which 
supported the agreement, had more political power.3 While domestic disapproval of a treaty is 
not enough to prohibit ratification in most cases, it certainly complicates the process. 
If there is too much disapproval of a treaty or the negotiator’s actions, it may be possible 
to remove the responsible domestic leaders from power.  Leaders generally do not wish to be 
caught cheating either other countries or their own citizens because this can result in dismissal 
from their positions.4 However, for this to be a constraint, the actors must believe that the public 
will likely hold them accountable, either by rewarding or punishing them for the results of the 
negotiations.5 Knowledge of how hard it is to remove a leader, which is controlled by the 
domestic institutions, can help improve international cooperation.6 If the cost of removal is too 
high to be feasible, a states’ negotiator will not require the cooperation of other domestic leaders.  
                                                             
1 Joseph Frankel. “Domestic Politics of Japan's Foreign Policy: A Case Study of the Ratification of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty.”  
2 Gordon J. Idang. “The Politics of Nigerian Foreign Poligy: The Ratification and Renunciation of the Anglo-
Nigerian Defence Agreement.” African Studies Review 13.2 (1970): 227-251.  
3 Gordon J. Idang. “The Politics of Nigerian Foreign Poligy: The Ratification and Renunciation of the Anglo-
Nigerian Defence Agreement.” 
4 Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith. “The Impact of Leadership Turnover and Domestic Institutions on 
International Cooperation.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 49.5 (2005): 639-660.  
5 Peter F. Trumbore. “Electoral Politics as Domestic Ratification in International Negotiations: Insights from the 
Anglo-Irish Peace Process.” 
6 Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith. “The Impact of Leadership Turnover and Domestic Institutions on 
International Cooperation.” 
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If the cost is low, the negotiator is more likely to cooperate both domestically and 
internationally.1 
In summary, it is clear that while international factors are important in conflict resolution, 
neglecting to include domestic factors in analysis limits the depth of analysis.  Through 
institutions, politics and public opinion, domestic constraints have a large effect on what is 
ratifiable in a particular country.  As these factors limit the possibility of domestic ratification, if 
they are considered during conflict resolution, there is a greater likelihood that ratification will 
be successful.  Additionally, they must be considered in any analysis of ratification or failure 
thereof. 
2.2 Ratification 
 
Conflict termination ideally results in ratification of a treaty to signify binding agreement 
on the issue.  Traditionally, ratification of treaties was not required because the signatures of the 
monarchs negotiating the agreement were binding.2 With the dissolution of monarchical states 
came the importance of ratification. 
Whether or not states are obligated to ratify treaties that they have negotiated or signed is 
a contested point.  Some authorities on the subject believe that, as long as the negotiator did not 
transcend his instructions, the state has a perfect or legal obligation to ratify the treaty.3 Other 
experts disagree, suggesting that there is a moral obligation but no legal obligation, or that treaty 
ratification is completely a matter of discretion.4 There does not appear to be a prevailing 
                                                             
1 Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith. “The Impact of Leadership Turnover and Domestic Institutions on 
International Cooperation.” 
2 John Eugene Harley. “The Obligation to Ratify Treaties.” The American Journal of International Law 13.3 (1919): 
389-405. 
3 John Eugene Harley. “The Obligation to Ratify Treaties.” 
4 John Eugene Harley. “The Obligation to Ratify Treaties.” 
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viewpoint of which perspective is correct.  However, it is viewed that "countries and their 
governments as the principal international actors maximize their own utility without regard to the 
welfare of other actors on the basis of a given set of preferences and subject to constraints of 
power.”1 This is essentially a rational actor assumption and the foundation for game theory.  A 
game theoretical approach to treaty ratification would suggest that countries do not view 
ratification as an obligation, but rather as an available option, should that option have the best 
results for the country.   
When deciding whether or not to ratify a treaty, a country’s actors must weigh the costs 
and benefits of ratification.  Ratifying a treaty makes the country part of a broad international 
action.2 Ostensibly, ratification signifies a country’s full acceptance of the terms of that treaty.3 
This can send a message about what the country values and that it pledges to follow international 
laws.  Another benefit is enhancing national security.4 While not every treaty necessarily 
enhances national security, international cooperation is one way to ensure that your country will 
be protected or supported by the international community should a security issue arise.  
Ratification can also increase a country’s influence and power in the international community, 
whereas failure to ratify undermines international credibility.5 A country that has ratified a treaty 
can also work on interpretation and implementation and increase the likelihood that the treaty 
will be understood the way it wants.6  
                                                             
1 Eric Neumayer. “Qualified Ratification: Explaining Reservations to International Human Rights Treaties.” The 
Journal of Legal Studies 36.2 (2007): 397-429. Section 2. 
2 John Eugene Harley. “The Obligation to Ratify Treaties.” 
3 David Weissbrodt, et al. “Prospects for U.S. Ratification of the Convention Against Torture.” Proceedings of the 
Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 83 (1989): 529-547. 
4 John Eugene Harley. “The Obligation to Ratify Treaties.” 
5 John Eugene Harley. “The Obligation to Ratify Treaties.”; David Weissbrodt,  et al. “Prospects for U.S. 
Ratification of the Convention Against Torture.” 
6 David Weissbrodt, et al. “Prospects for U.S. Ratification of the Convention Against Torture.” 
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However, there are costs to ratifying treaties and sometimes these costs can outweigh the 
benefits.  Generally, ratifying a treaty means a country has an obligation to follow the terms of 
the treaty.1 This could necessitate reworking existing laws and can cause conflict with legal 
enforcement.2 In order for a law to be properly enforced, it must avoid ambiguity and subjective 
wording, qualities that are very common in treaties due to the many compromises necessary in 
treaty negotiations.3 It also means that the specific definitions in the treaty are the new legal 
definitions, which can create enforcement issues.  For example, the definition of torture in the 
United Nations Convention Against Torture would have classified many of the aspects of 
conscription to the United States Military as torture.4 Clearly that is a serious issue the United 
States had to consider when discussing ratification of that convention.  Problems with 
enforcement endanger local law enforcement agents who may not correctly enforce all of the 
aspects of the new law, whether because the treaty conflicts with domestic law or because the 
treaty is unclear.5 Treaties can also have undesirable consequences, such as prohibiting desirable 
behaviors.  For example, the Geneva Protocol on Gas and Bacteriological Warfare could have 
the unintended consequence of limiting riot-control agents and chemical herbicides.6 The intent 
of that protocol was to increase peace and protect soldiers, but it also could have a disastrous 
effect on farming and domestic police work.   
Many countries will attempt to limit the costs of ratifying a specific treaty while still 
gaining the benefits.  The most popular way to accomplish this is through reservations, 
understandings, and declarations (RUDs).  RUDs send a mixed international message; a country 
                                                             
1 John Eugene Harley. “The Obligation to Ratify Treaties.” 
2 John Eugene Harley. “The Obligation to Ratify Treaties.”; David Weissbrodt, et al. “Prospects for U.S. 
Ratification of the Convention Against Torture.” 
3 David Weissbrodt, et al. “Prospects for U.S. Ratification of the Convention Against Torture.” 
4 David Weissbrodt, et al. “Prospects for U.S. Ratification of the Convention Against Torture.” 
5 David Weissbrodt, et al. “Prospects for U.S. Ratification of the Convention Against Torture.” 
6 John Norton Moore. “Ratification of the Geneva Protocol on Gas and Bacteriological Warfare: A Legal and 
Political Analysis.” Virginia Law Review 58.3 (1972): 419-509.  
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is willing to abide by all of the terms of the treaty except the ones it does not like.  They are a 
legitimate way of “accounting for cultural, religious, or political diversity across nations” but 
they tend to send a poor international message and slow the ratification process.1 One benefit to 
RUDs is that they can serve to clear up implementation issues by clarifying what a certain nation 
believes the vague treaty language means.2 This can be an issue because the interpretation can be 
wrong, however eventually the treaty will have to be implemented and if the language is vague, 
the implementation could be wrong even without RUDs.  There does appear to be a limit of how 
many RUDs are acceptable before ratification becomes essentially meaningless.  In the United 
States, numerous reservations have stopped several human rights conventions from being 
seriously debated.3  Liberal democratic and more politically constrained countries are much more 
likely to have RUDs than authoritarian states.4 The prevailing ideology is that if a country does 
not plan on implementing a treaty, as is often the case in authoritarian states, there is no purpose 
to RUDs.   
After weighing all the costs and benefits of ratifying and considering the possibility of 
RUDs, a country can cite many reasons as grounds for refusal to ratify.  For instance, if the 
negotiator is either threatened with force or menace during negotiations or he goes beyond the 
boundaries set by the ratifying agent, a country is within its rights to refuse to ratify.5 Another 
reason to refuse is the impossibility, either literally or morally, for a country to ratify the treaty.  
If any clause of the treaty is contradictory to a contractant’s domestic law, ratification may be 
refused.  Lastly, if any of the circumstances under which the treaty was agreed and signed have 
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changed, a country may refuse to ratify.1 While these are all legitimate reasons for refusal to 
ratify, most are rarely applicable today and other explanations and justifications must be present. 
 Ratification is a central part of international conflict termination.  It would appear that 
there is not an obligation to ratify, and in fact there are many reasons not to ratify, or to only 
ratify with RUDs.  Conversely, the international perception of a lack of ratification may 
outweigh the costs of the ratification.  In the end, ratification of a treaty depends on the specifics 
of the treaty and the specific domestic environment to which the treaty will apply.   
2.3 Treaty power in the United States 
 
 Most of the literature about ratification and domestic constraints covers the controversial 
problems that federal states face with either states’ rights in ratification or domestic 
implementation of treaties.  Professor Max Sǿrenson from the University of Aarhus supports the 
idea that "the federal system of government is particularly ill-adapted to international 
cooperation.”2 This is because the founders of federal states generally believed in limiting the 
power of the central government.  This intentional limiting of the central government and its 
consequences for ratification is a central tenant of my research question.  The United States 
appears to be one of the more controversial federal states, at least in regards to the treaty power.  
The majority of relevant literature covers the tension both between the central and state 
governments and between the branches of the American system of limited government, though 
several other federal systems and even unitary governments appear in the literature as well. 
 There are generally two sides to the argument over the treaty power in America – one 
side supporting the federal government and one supporting states’ rights.  Among those who 
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champion the supremacy of the central government in treaty matters, there is the concern that if 
the federal government is constrained in the treaty power, the nation will appear divided in 
international relations.  "States' individual interests are best promoted through national unity,” 
and fragmentation due to states’ rights could lead to a weakened international position for the 
United States.1 A central idea supporting this position is that during treaty making states should 
delegate their powers to the federal government.2 Proponents argue that there is sufficient 
protection of states’ rights in the Senate, a body that was formed to protect states’ interests and 
give them equal voice, that additional representation in treaty ratification is unnecessary.  
Furthermore, treaty ratification requires a supermajority, which is cited as additional protection 
for the states.3 Professor Lori Damrosch of Columbia Law School interprets constitutional law to 
indicate that “the treaty-makers may make supreme law binding on the states as to any subject, 
and notions of states' rights should not be asserted as impediments to the full implementation of 
treaty obligations.”4  
History illustrates a bleak picture for states’ rights.  Around the time of the Constitutional 
Convention, individual states had a reputation for not complying with federally ratified treaties, 
which frustrated the founders.5 Proponents view this as evidence that the founders intended to 
give the federal government supremacy over states’ rights because the states could not be trusted 
in international matters.  Swaine cites the dormant treaty power by arguing that “state bargaining 
generates disadvantages for the collective interests of the states that are best avoided by 
centralizing the conduct of international negotiations in the Senate and the President," and, 
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therefore, states cannot be allowed to interfere with treaty making.1 The Supreme Court has 
tended to support this view by showing “sensitivity toward accommodating the United States' 
ability to promote its interests through international law" and rarely ruling in states’ favor in 
cases involving treaty power limitations.2 
 Many of the arguments in favor of federal supremacy exaggerate the consequences of 
recognizing the states’ rights’ limit on the treaty power.  While it is important to maintain unity 
in international bargaining, the treaty power should not, and perhaps cannot, invade subject 
matter which is state sovereign.3 It is unlikely that recognizing states’ rights will cause the 
United States to present a divided front, especially as “united voice” is not possible in a country 
with three separate branches of government.4 “A treaty cannot bind the United States to do what 
their Constitution forbids them to do,” namely passing unconstitutional laws by ratifying treaties 
that involve areas not under federal purview.5 Because treaties have domestic implications, they 
must adhere to the Constitution.  The Constitution very clearly lists the powers reserved to the 
states, including reserving all unenumerated powers to the states.  The Founders were wary of 
federal supremacy and even forbade certain powers from the federal government.  The treaty 
power is not exempt from these limitations.6 The Founders wanted treaties, like laws, to be 
difficult to make, and they delegated treaty-making power to the Senate, the federal body that 
was supposed to be representative of states’ rights.  The analysis of the actions and desires of the 
Founders supports the idea that the federal government should be limited in the treaty power and 
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should not disregard states’ rights.1 According to Bradley, “there is no justification for giving the 
treaty power special immunity for such protection” as the Supreme Court has indicated that 
“federalism is to be the subject of judicial protection.”2 The anticommandeering principle is 
relevant to this discussion as well.  As long as treaties require state enforcement or legislation, 
the treaty power cannot be unaffected by states’ rights.3 However, it is important that states 
comply with ratified treaties because to do otherwise hinders America’s international efforts.4 
 America’s rigid separation of powers is another source of domestic tension over the 
treaty power.  The president is the main negotiating power in international relations, which the 
Founders intended to “enhance the minority-state check in the Senate.”5 The Senate’s role is to 
assist the president in his decision, but the text of the Constitution is vague about this power.  It 
is unclear if the Senate is meant to assist the president before, during, or after negotiations are 
concluded and if the advice of the Senate is binding.6 The judicial branch is not involved until 
after a treaty has been ratified.  Because treaty ratification does not require public records of 
debate, unlike regular laws, it is difficult for the judicial branch to infer meaning from the treaty.7 
Treaty language is often vague to appeal to many different nations, and this sometimes results in 
confusion regarding specific definitions and enforcement.  Without the guidance of public 
records of negotiations, the judicial branch has a difficult task in applying the law appropriately.  
Overall, because the Founders wished to limit the central government through the federal system 
and separation of powers, the United States experiences a great deal of controversy regarding 
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treaty ratification.  This controversy and the subsequent difficulty in ratification is a direct result 
of the United States’ federal and presidential system.   
2.4 Treaty power in similar states 
 
Australia has a similar tension between states rights and federal powers, especially with 
the treaty power.  The Australian federal government draws its power to ratify treaties from the 
“external affairs” power granted in its constitution.1 As the name implies, this empowers the 
federal government to act internationally on behalf of all of the states, a power that is rather 
common among nations with a federal system.  To date, the Australian federal government has 
been powerful in its ability to ratify treaties, even treaties that may conflict with powers granted 
directly to the states.  The majority of judges believe this is the best way to maintain continuity 
in the country and in international bargaining.  Some judges, however, are worried that this is 
just the tip of the iceberg, according to Byrnes and Charlesworth.  They are afraid that this will 
weaken federalist distribution of powers by taking powers away from the states.  Byrnes and 
Charlesworth stress that it is important to have “state cooperation in the implementation of 
international obligations” in order for a treaty to be effective.2  Australia also has tension 
between its federal branches of government.  The treaty power is such that the executive 
approves ratification; the legislature must then implement and enforce the treaty without having 
had input in the ratification process. This leads to “federal hesitation” or “federal reluctance” to 
ratify treaties in fear that the legislature will be unable to implement a treaty that has been 
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ratified by the executive.1  This federal reluctance is the product of the shared government 
powers and results in the ratification of fewer treaties.   
 Nigeria, another federal state, has a constitutionally stronger central government than 
either Australia or the United States.  Nigeria’s constitution focuses on federal dominance.  In 
the concurrent legislative list of shared responsibility – the enumerated powers granted to both 
the states and the central government – the federal powers override and take supremacy over the 
state powers.2 The purpose of this was to strengthen the national government and establish its 
authority in the country.  The constitution also maintains that federal laws and decisions will 
remain supreme over individual states’ laws and gives the federal government more exclusive 
authority than the federal governments in the United States and Australia.3 However, this federal 
country still has conflicts over the treaty power.  The treaty power in Nigeria is similar to that in 
Australia and the United States in that the ratifying agent is not the implementing agent.  In 
Nigeria, the duty of implementation belongs to the states while the federal government is 
responsible for ratifying treaties.4 This creates tension between the regional and the federal 
governments over which treaties are ratified and how they affect governance in the states.  This 
tension could result in some treaties not being ratified or a longer ratification period. 
 Canada, on the other hand, is a much weaker federal state than Nigeria.  Compared to 
America, the Canadian central government has less power to implement treaties.5 Many 
international treaties involve subject matter that is the right of the provinces in Canada.  
However, Byrnes and Charlesworth note that this does not seem to inhibit Canada “to any great 
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extent” in its treaty negotiation and ratification process.  Instead, it has resulted in an “extensive 
consultative process” in which the provinces have substantial input in how a treaty will be 
approved and implemented.1 This is remarkably different from how power sharing occurs in the 
United States and Australia and illustrates that federalism does not necessarily have to result in 
tension between the regional governments and the federal governments.  Though the Canadian 
process is quite long, it appears to be a system in which both the federal governments and 
regional authorities are able to exercise their appropriate powers without interfering with one 
another.  While the Canadian federal system works well in coordinating regional and federal 
powers of treaty ratification, this system of cooperation is rare among federal countries.   
 Switzerland technically has a federal system of government, but it is incredibly 
centralized to the point where it functions nearly as a unitary government.2 It has an organization 
similar to the one outlined in the United States’ 10th amendment, reserving all remaining powers 
to the states, but it does not have a subject matter limitation for the treaty power, even if the 
treaty regards a power belonging to the cantons (states).  However, the central government 
avoids acting on this issue if at all possible.3 The lack of tension between regional and central 
government is found between the branches of government as well.  The legislature is highly 
involved in the treaty process; both chambers must review and pass the law before it moves on to 
the Federal Council, the executive branch, for approval.  Theoretically, the seven members of the 
Federal Council must abide by the legislature’s expressed desires, but it has not been tested to 
what extent this is necessary.4 There is no judicial review in Switzerland, and this appears to 
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lessen the conflict horizontally between branches and vertically between the cantonal and central 
governments as every law passed is automatically constitutional merely by its passage.  The final 
ratifying power lies with the people in the form of an optional popular referendum on a treaty.  
This has barely been used in Switzerland, but it serves as a constraint because the central 
government must always consider the possibility of a referendum.1 This essentially means the 
end result is close to the popular desire of the people because it is in the government’s best 
interest to not have a referendum.  It is interesting to observe how Switzerland, though a federal 
state, avoids most conflict in government and with its people by involving many aspects of the 
country in its ratification process.  It is much more similar to the Canadian approach of 
collaboration than the American or Australian approach of discord and legal battles.  Similar to 
Canada, the degree of collaboration and consensus could draw out ratification or inhibit 
ratification due to the amount of players involved in the process.    
 Great Britain, while not a federal state, made great strides toward sharing the treaty 
power among different branches in the 1920s.  Technically, the government (the executive 
branch) has the sole power to ratify treaties without publication of the treaties or advice from 
Parliament.2 However, starting with the Treaty of Lausanne to partition the Ottoman Empire in 
1924, the government has had a more open policy of treaty ratification.  It was decided that 
Parliament would “be allowed an adequate opportunity for the discussion of all treaties before 
their final ratification.”3 The government does not require approval of a treaty from the 
Parliament, but Scott correctly believes it is unlikely that the government, a group of leaders 
chosen from the legislature, would deviate much from the expressed wishes of Parliament.  Such 
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action could result in calling for an election or replacement of the majority party leader.  The 
effect was “the Americanization of the British Constitution,” or a more public approach to 
treaties.  The hope was this would “exercise a sobering effect on treaties” and help preserve both 
international and domestic peace.1 It was generally believed by members of the government that 
if a government is unwilling to disclose the terms of a treaty to its people, it should not agree to 
the treaty.  The new plan allowed for 21 days between the signing of a treaty and ratification of a 
treaty, during which Parliament could peruse, debate, and either support or condemn the treaty 
before the government made a final decision.  Though separation of powers is not a part of the 
British system of government, this tempered the executive’s treaty power and somewhat 
weakened the central government by making it more accountable to both the legislature and the 
people and resulted in a longer ratification process.   
 In sum, federal systems and governments with some form of limited power experience 
roadblocks in the ratification of treaties.  Sharing power requires debate and discussion before 
ratification and can sometimes result in a failure to ratify.  The literature supports the conclusion 
that states with institutional domestic constraints have a higher likelihood of a long and more 
difficult ratification process.   
3.  Background 
 
 This chapter will cover the remaining background material necessary to understand the 
concepts explored in this paper.  It explains the idea of “exceptional” America – that is the 
criticism that the United States believes its hegemonic power exempts it from the necessity of 
observing international laws and codes of conduct.  It also gives factual background on the 
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details of the United States treaty power, covering the different responsibilities guaranteed in the 
Constitution and outlining the ratification process. 
3.1 Exceptional America 
 
The United States has, especially recently, been criticized as viewing itself as 
exceptional.  While in some cases this can be viewed a credible criticism, in many situations, 
such as treaty ratification, it is both overused and misused.  According to critics, through time, 
“Americans became accustomed to thinking of their country as 'the indispensible nation’” 
because “the status of the United States as 'sole superpower' appeared unassailable.1  Its 
dominance was unquestioned and unambiguous…it was the conventional wisdom.”2  This gave 
American exceptionalism, originally simply the idea of being different from most other world 
powers, an “obtuse American” angle as the act of being different took on a new connotation.3   
American dominance in international relations often has a positive effect, in that the 
country has demonstrated an exceptional commitment to democracy, international law, and 
human rights.4  Unfortunately, this dominance can also be construed as American arrogance in 
international relations.  Michael Ignatieff has laid out three types of what he calls exceptionalism 
with the last, American exceptionalism, being the most egregious charge against the United 
States in international relations.  Here, the term exceptionalism is misused to refer to the belief 
that the United States is exceptional, as the term takes on the negative connotation earlier 
discussed.  The first charge Ignatieff lays against the United States is human rights narcissism, a 
belief that the First Amendment embodies all of the important rights and ignores other rights 
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“that are widely accepted throughout the rest of the world.”1  The second, judicial 
exceptionalism, refers to the belief that the “practices of foreign countries are irrelevant to US 
constitutional interpretation.”2  The last is the practice of exemption from “certain international 
law rules and agreements.”3  The first two are cited as more of a nuisance or non-issue, however, 
the double standards involved in the last type present a large problem for Koh.  He feels “the 
United States uses its exceptional power and wealth to promote a double standard.”4 This action 
has been explained by the United States’ unwillingness to be subject to international treaties in 
fear of being constrained in domestic and international actions.  There is a belief held among 
critics that even when the United States ratifies a treaty, it does so “in a way designed to 
preclude…any domestic effect.”5  One way to accomplish this is to use reservations, 
understandings, and declarations as previously discussed.  While the United States does use 
RUDs from time to time to clarify how the United States will interpret or view a treaty, it does 
not always attach these and occasionally forgoes ratification when it feels the RUDs would 
undermine the purpose of the treaty.   
Critics of the United States’ international actions cite a unique ratification strategy.  
Because treaties in the U.S. are not self-executing, they sometimes require additional domestic 
legislation to implement the treaty.  However, it is often declared that the United States does not 
require any implementing legislation because the current legislation is sufficient to address the 
treaty conditions.6  This behavior "suggests a view that human rights treaties should be embraced 
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only insofar as they codify existing US practice, not if they would compel any change in US 
behavior.”1  
These criticisms of the United States are often narrow-minded.  While some of the 
arguments are undoubtedly legitimate because the United States is not a perfect country, most 
only consider part of the situation.  When the United States ratifies a treaty, it intends to comply 
with it, while some other states may show an outward approval through ratification but do not 
attempt to comply.  Because of this, if the United States cannot comply with a treaty for 
whatever reason, it does not ratify it in an attempt to pretend to follow the provisions.  Further, 
the United States is not the only state to submit RUDs, and it does attempt to keep the purpose of 
the treaty intact when it does so.  Lastly, it is unfairly critical and cynical to assume that the 
United States is being untruthful when it declares that current domestic legislation is in 
compliance with a treaty.  There is little reason to accept this criticism as true, as if this were the 
case, there would surely be widespread, serious, international backlash and criticism regarding 
compliance with treaties.   
3.2 The Ratification Process  
 
 In the United States, the Constitution divides the treaty power between the executive and 
legislative branches.  The president has the power to make treaties while the Senate has the 
power to “concur.”2  The Senate does not ratify treaties but rather it gives advice and consent to 
ratification.  First a treaty is signed, either by the president or a diplomatic figure working on 
behalf of the president.  The president then may submit the treaty to the Senate for ratification.  
However, the president is under no obligation to submit the treaty and may choose to submit it at 
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a later date if he believes the Senate will not approve ratification at that time.  Since signed 
treaties do not expire, they can be submitted to the Senate at any time by any president.  If a 
treaty is submitted to the Senate for consideration, the Senate can approve it, reject it, or take no 
action on it.  Acceptance requires a two-thirds majority and can include reservations, 
understandings, declarations, interpretations, or any other statements the Senate would like to 
include in the decision.1  As with the decision itself, these additions are the advice of the Senate; 
the president must decide whether or not to negotiate them into the ratification.  The two-thirds 
majority vote usually requires the Senate to overcome the party divide and take bipartisan action 
on the treaty.  This raises the ratification threshold in the United States because the treaty must 
be agreeable to both parties.   
If the treaty receives Senate approval, the president then formally ratifies the treaty with 
the other parties.  If the treaty does not come to a vote, it remains in the Senate until either the 
president removes it or the Senate requests its removal.  Because the treaties do not expire in the 
Senate, a treaty can be resurrected from the Committee on Foreign Relations and ratified at a 
much later date should there be a push for ratification, though this occurs infrequently.  If 
resurrected, these treaties can be used as political tools or avenues for social change.  Bilateral 
treaties are usually submitted immediately and discussed, then either approved or rejected 
without additional discussion, due to the nature of bilateral negotiations.  For multilateral 
treaties, the process is more complicated and a treaty may go back and forth from the committee 
to the floor several times or languish in committee for decades without approval.   
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4.  American Exceptionalism 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, one of the most popular explanations for American 
nonratification of important multi-lateral treaties is that of American arrogance and double 
standards.  The term “American exceptionalism” often has been used to explain this concept, but 
it is a misuse of the term.  "American exceptionalism has been used far too loosely and without 
meaningful nuance" and has lost much of its meaning.1 For the purpose of this paper, American 
exceptionalism will be defined as the circumstance of America being an exception rather than the 
belief that America is exceptional.  In the following sections I will argue that American 
exceptionalism can be applied to the American outlier effect in treaty ratification.  First, 
however, this chapter will explain the concept of American exceptionalism. 
American exceptionalism in international affairs has its roots in the Paris Peace 
Conference of 1919 and President Woodrow Wilson’s 14 points following World War I.2 Before 
this, the concept was generally viewed as an isolationist quality rather than exceptionalism.  At 
that time the United States declined to join the League of Nations even though President Wilson 
had been instrumental in the institution’s formation.  With the United States demonstrating that it 
was willing to participate in world affairs, both through its actions in the war and President 
Wilson’s 14 points, the idea of isolationism was replaced with that of American exceptionalism. 
Lockhart lists historical, institutional, and cultural variables as the roots of American 
exceptionalism in domestic policies.3  While America’s domestic exceptionalism and 
international exceptionalism are not the same, their causes are related.  Simmons upholds this 
connection as she lists democratic institutions, cultural characteristics, and occasionally 
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government orientation as factors that affect a country’s ability and predisposition to ratify 
treaties.1 Though she leaves out historical factors, the three parts of American exceptionalism are 
so closely related at times that it can be difficult to fully distinguish the difference between them.  
The particular culture in the United States has a historical basis, as the values of independence 
and individual freedoms originated from the country’s history as a dissatisfied British colony.  
Institutions in the United States were influenced during their formation by this culture and the 
historical concerns about abuse of power.  In turn, the institutions affected events in American 
history and helped further shape the culture as it evolved.   
Historically, the United States has had unique political and social experiences.  The lack 
of a feudal system in the early United States pushed the creation of a strong middle class not 
found in many European countries.2  The secession from Britain and its political implications 
laid the foundation for the concepts of separation of power and a relatively weak, federal system.  
Until around the 1950s the United States was protected from any severe sudden changes as it was 
"unusually well insulated from the threats of foreign attack and many international economic 
problems.”3  As opposed to countries with several borders, the United States was cushioned by 
oceans and relatively friendly neighbors and thus was allowed to form and modernize with only 
moderate influence from other states. 
Institutions, a central factor of this paper, are cited as having a strong effect on American 
exceptionalism.  Because “institutions in general are sticky, change of, in, and by them is further 
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slowed by the stickiness of cultures laden with tradition, habit, custom, and simple inertia."1 
Institutions have a large impact on domestic and international policies and tend to encourage 
path dependency.  Institutions in the United States were created by religious dissenters who 
"shared a preference for more egalitarian, congregational forms of worship and social life than 
the relatively hierarchical forms” in Europe.2  The institutions are a reflection of the people who 
created them, who were generally more individualist and entrepreneurial than those who stayed 
behind in Europe.3  It took a certain type of person to be willing to move to a new colony that 
was far from home and largely unknown, and these people and their progeny are those who 
would later form the new government in America and leave their mark on the new system.  
Furthermore, after American independence, the country attracted many who were dissatisfied 
with the traditional governmental structure of Europe.4  This further increased the tendency to 
build institutions that put more value on the power of the individual rather than following a rigid, 
hierarchical structure both economically and socially.  The foundation of American institutions is 
important because the “character of these institutions may make some new policy directions 
more feasible than others," a concept that applies to both domestic and international actions.5 
Clearly, the historical, cultural, and institutional factors are not unrelated and thus the 
effects of each individually are difficult to isolate.  The institutions provide for a great deal of 
separation of powers because the founders were concerned with the possibility of one person 
gathering all the power to himself, especially as they had just fought a war to prevent such an 
occurrence.  As the culture in the United States focused on equality more than the traditional 
                                                             
1 Andrei S. Markovits and Steven L. Hellerman. Offside: Soccer and American Exceptionalism. 14; Charles 
Lockhart. The Roots of American Exceptionalism: History, Institutions and Culture.  
2 Charles Lockhart. The Roots of American Exceptionalism: History, Institutions and Culture. 8. 
3 Charles Lockhart. The Roots of American Exceptionalism: History, Institutions and Culture. 
4 Charles Lockhart. The Roots of American Exceptionalism: History, Institutions and Culture. 
5 Charles Lockhart. The Roots of American Exceptionalism: History, Institutions and Culture. 7. 
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feudalism beliefs in Europe dictated, the institutions were formed differently than those in 
Europe.1  The end result is that American culture, history, and therefore institutions place a 
greater emphasis on liberty and autonomy than other governments.2  
The concept of American exceptionalism applies well to treaty ratification.  The treaty 
power is a perfect example of separation of powers, as the executive negotiates treaties, the 
Senate approves them, and then the executive must ratify them.  It allows the construct of 
separation of powers and the possibility of divided government to have a serious effect on 
ratification.  The desire for a weak central government motivated the founders to give the states 
powers that are technically outside of the purview of the federal government.  This can create 
difficulties with ratification of treaties that cover issues delegated to the states.  Historically the 
United States was relatively self-sufficient and not dependent on many other countries, and 
therefore it was able to isolate itself.  It was also founded by a group of free-thinking, 
independent individuals who placed a high premium on preventing unnecessary government 
interference.  This has created a culture in which the government can be hesitant to regulate 
certain actions that the people may believe to be their freedoms.  The following sections will 
apply these concepts to concrete examples to explore American exceptionalism’s effect on treaty 
ratification. 
5.  Treaty Analysis 
 
 This chapter will explore how the institutional and cultural aspects of American 
exceptionalism apply to treaty ratification using treaty data.  I use OECD data about major 
multilateral treaties that have not been ratified by the United States to examine the effect 
                                                             
1 Charles Lockhart. The Roots of American Exceptionalism: History, Institutions and Culture. 
2 Charles Lockhart. The Roots of American Exceptionalism: History, Institutions and Culture. 
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institutional difference has on treaty ratification.  The institutional differences included here are 
those that together set the United States apart from the majority of other countries – 
bicameralism, presidentialism, and federalism.  Following the analysis of the institutional factors 
I explore the ideological make-up of the United States government for each of the treaties and 
postulate on its effect and the importance of timing in treaty ratification. 
5.1 Methods 
5.1.1 Treaties 
 I define major multilateral treaties as United Nations treaties that have 100 or more 
parties, as this is a clear majority of UN member states.  Out of these 39 treaties, the United 
States has not ratified 19 treaties.  Of the 19 unratified treaties, the United States has signed 14 of 
these treaties and has not signed five.  The treaties are listed in the table on the next page. 
For this comparison I use countries from the OECD, thereby controlling for countries that 
share the United States’ characteristics of liberal democracy and capitalism.  I calculate the 
length of ratification time using each treaty’s official submission date and the date of ratification 
for each country.  For my purposes, I included treaties marked with “accession” as ratified 
treaties because accession usually requires the same process as ratification, without a previous 
signature.1  As treaties often have a time limit for signature, a country may not have the 
opportunity to ratify a treaty because it has not signed it, and therefore “accession” is the 
strongest available option.  Most treaties are closed for signatures after a certain number of 
countries have ratified the treaty.  Treaties that have “approval” or “acceptance” by a country are 
not included in my work, though I do list them after the treaties as these processes are not similar 
to ratification.  Countries that have “succession to signature” are also excluded.  While these last 
                                                             
1 United Nations. Office of Legal Affairs. Treaty Reference Guide. 2001. 
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three types of countries are parties to the treaties, they do not go through the ratification process, 
or what is very similar to the ratification process, and so the data do not apply in this case.1 
 Treaty Year Submitted 
Number of 
Parties 
U.S.  
Action 
1 Convention on Biological Diversity 1993 193 Signed 
2 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 1996 188 Signed 
3 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, 
Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on their Destruction 
1997 156 No action 
4 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants 2001 173 Signed 
5 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 1997 192 Signed 
6 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies 1949 118 No action 
7 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 1966 160 Signed 
8 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid  1973 107 No action 
9 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 1979 187 Signed 
10 Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 193 Signed 
11 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2006 106 Signed 
12 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 145 No action 
13 
Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed 
Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous 
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade 
1998 144 Signed 
14 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 111 Signed 
15 Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court 1998 118 Signed 
16 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 162 No action 
17 World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 2003 174 Signed 
18 
Basel Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary1989 Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and their Disposal 
1989 173 Signed 
19 Agreement Establishing the Common Fund for Commodities 1980 117 Signed 
 
  
                                                             
1 United Nations. Office of Legal Affairs. Treaty Reference Guide. 2001. 
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5.1.2 Exclusion of Russia 
  Russia is also a federal, semi-presidential, bicameral system of government; however it 
is not included in this study.  It faces similar criticism as the United States from the international 
community about its world affairs, including a tendency to apply a double standard to 
international cooperation.  While the history and evolution of Russia is quite different from that 
of the United States, both countries are frequently viewed internationally as outliers.  
Furthermore, both are criticized for lack of complete involvement in major international affairs.  
On the surface, the two countries may have more in common than one might originally assume. 
However, Russia poses several problems as a case.  First, it is not actually a liberal 
democracy, as is the rest of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.  The 
history of Russian development sets the country apart from the United States, regardless of the 
shared institutional characteristics.  While Russia is different from most of the developed world, 
it is for very different reasons from the historical, institutional, and cultural reasons that form 
American exceptionalism.  Because of this, attempting to understand the Russian outlier effect 
will not necessarily shed light on the American outlier effect.  In addition, Russian democratic 
institutions are questionable in that the political power is in reality concentrated in one person, 
usually the president.  While the country is federal, it has become greatly centralized under the 
leadership of Vladimir Putin.  The institutions of presidentialism and bicameralism mean little in 
actuality in Russia as the executive branch controls the government.  Therefore, institutional 
similarities between the United States and Russia are in practice limited, and Russia is not an 
appropriate case for inclusion.   
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5.2 Institutions 
 
In the following sections I examine the treaties according to each country’s 
characteristics.  The corresponding tables can be found in Appendix 1.  In the tables the countries 
with the same characteristic as the United States being discussed, that is presidential, bicameral, 
or federal, are marked in green. 
5.2.1 Presidentialism1 
 
Of the 19 treaties, the presidential countries ratified seven treaties later than the majority 
of other ratifying OECD countries.  For one treaty, the Agreement Establishing the Common 
Fund for Commodities (19), the presidential countries ratified around the median length of 
ratification.2  In ratification of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (11), the 
presidential countries actually ratified earlier than the majority of other ratifying OECD 
countries.  For the remaining nine treaties, without including the International Convention on the 
Suppression of the Crime of Apartheid (8), the presidential countries’ ratification times were 
spread fairly evenly throughout the time line.  In the International Convention on the 
Suppression of the Crime of Apartheid, the only presidential country that is a party to the 
convention, Mexico, did ratify later than the majority of other ratifying OECD countries, 
however as only four OECD countries are parties to this treaty, this treaty is not significant for 
the purpose of this study, though the treaty would be interesting to be examined in its own right.   
 Presidential countries are sometimes missing from the list of parties to the treaty.  Chile 
did not sign or ratify the Agreement Establishing the Common Fund for Commodities (19), the 
                                                             
1 The presidential countries are Chile, Mexico, South Korea, and Switzerland. 
2 For easy identification, the corresponding treaty number for the tables in Section 5.1.1 and Appendix 1 follows the 
treaty name. 
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treaty in which the remaining three presidential countries fell in the median of OECD ratification 
time.  Switzerland signed the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control (17) but has not yet ratified it, and it has not even signed the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (11), the treaty in which the other presidential countries demonstrated 
early ratification, or the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized 
Agencies (6).  Mexico has also failed to sign or ratify the Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the Specialized Agencies (6), while South Korea has not acted on the Convention 
on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and 
on their Destruction (3).   
 Canada is a good illustration of the effect of presidentialism on ratification.  Canada has a 
similar culture to the United States.  It is also a bicameral (though weak bicameral, as discussed 
in a later section) and federal state.  Canada tends to ratify early, falling in the first half of the 
ratification timeline in 12 of the 19 treaties.  With the exception of the International Convention 
on the Suppression of the Crime of Apartheid (8), Canada has only failed to ratify one treaty.  
The comparison of the United States and Canada holds as many domestic characteristics constant 
as possible and shows that, though presidentialism does not appear to always affect treaty 
ratification, the differences between American and Canadian ratification implies that it does have 
an impact. 
The data suggests that sometimes presidential states do take longer to ratify major 
international treaties or may sometimes join the United States in failure to ratify.  However this 
is not the case with all 19 treaties, and more frequently presidential countries ratify in similar 
time frames to their parliamentary partners in the OECD.  While it would be false to say that 
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presidentialism always has a slowing effect on treaty ratification, in some cases it appears to 
have slowed the ratification process.   
5.2.2 Federalism1 
 Though the literature strongly supports the idea that federalism constrains the domestic 
treaty power, for the major multilateral treaties that the United States has not ratified, federalism 
does not appear to have had a significant slowing effect on ratification time.  For all 19 of the 
treaties, the federal OECD countries have ratified at a similar rate as the unitary OECD 
countries, falling evenly distributed throughout the timeline.  Furthermore, for 15 of the treaties, 
every federal country, other than the United States, ratified the treaty.  Of the remaining four 
treaties, two were ratified by seven of the eight federal countries, one was ratified by five, and 
the last was ratified by only one.  This last treaty, however, is the International Convention on 
the Suppression of the Crime of Apartheid (8), which as previously stated only has four parties 
from the OECD.  For the two treaties that were ratified by seven of the eight federal countries, 
the one country that joined the United States as a non-ratifier is Switzerland.  Switzerland is 
another unique case and frequently an outlier, due to its multi-person executive, presidential 
system and its historical role of neutrality and culture of privacy.  However, as a federal state, the 
federal government in Switzerland must work with the cantonal governments to ensure that 
ratification of a treaty is acceptable to the cantons.  In this sense, Switzerland is more similar, 
regarding federal relationships, to the United States than a country like Canada, where the federal 
government has more power over regional governments.   
 Ultimately, federalism alone does not appear to have a large effect on the time of 
ratification.  This is surprising because it is contradictory to both the literature on the subject and 
                                                             
1 The federal countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Mexico, Spain, and Switzerland. 
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common logic.  While literature on the limitations placed on ratification by bicameralism, 
presidentialism, and other institutional factors is not widely found, literature about the limitations 
placed on ratification by federalism is widespread, both in the abstract and in relation to 
federalism in specific countries.  In federal countries there are more veto players whose opinions 
must be considered in treaty ratification, especially as sometimes the regional governments have 
powers with which the federal government is constitutionally prohibited from interfering.  That 
these ideas are not reflected in the data is unexpected.   
5.2.3 Bicameralism1  
According to the literature, bicameralism should slow the ratification process as well, 
however this does not appear to hold true in this data.  Simmons’ comments on bicameralism 
limiting the ratification ability of the government are not reflected here.  While some of the 
bicameral countries did not ratify all of these treaties, the proportion that did not ratify is 
comparable to the proportion of all OECD countries that did not ratify.  For these 19 treaties, 
with the exception of the International Convention on the Suppression of the Crime of Apartheid 
(with only four OECD parties), the bicameral countries’ ratification times are either equally 
distributed throughout the time period or occasionally are distributed around the median OECD 
range.   
However, of the 19 bicameral countries in the OECD, only seven have bicameral 
legislatures in which the houses have equal power: Australia, Belgium, Chile, Germany, Italy, 
Switzerland, and the United States.   With those countries in mind, for eight of the treaties it took 
strong bicameral countries longer to ratify the treaties than either weak bicameral or unicameral 
                                                             
1 The bicameral countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom. 
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countries.  For most of the treaties, all of the strong bicameral countries ratified the treaty.  The 
exceptions are the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies (6) 
and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (11), on which Switzerland has not 
taken action, the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (17), 
which Switzerland signed but did not ratify, and the Agreement Establishing the Common Fund 
for Commodities (19), which neither Italy nor Chile has signed.   
 Like federalism, bicameralism should slow the process of ratification, at least when the 
country is a strong bicameral state.  Unicameral and weak bicameral states have fewer veto 
players than strong bicameral states simply because they only have one house.  Even if the end 
result is ratification, the discussions alone add time to the process.  For these 19 treaties, 
however, bicameralism alone did not appear to delay or greatly affect ratification.     
5.3 Switzerland and Mexico 
  
 As the only other bicameral, presidential, and federal states in the OECD, Switzerland 
and Mexico should be good comparison countries for the United States.  However, Mexico has a 
remarkably different culture and history from that of the United States.  Combined with the fact 
that Mexico is not as much of a liberal democracy as the United States, this precludes Mexico 
from constructive comparison with the United States.   
 Switzerland, on the other hand, is more similar to the United States than one might think.  
Though many of the specific features may be different, in that Switzerland has a seven member 
executive and a history of global neutrality, Switzerland also has unique institutions, culture, and 
history.  It is reasonable to believe that Switzerland’s domestic characteristics may limit its 
ability to ratify treaties and this effect is demonstrated in the treaty data.  Of the 19 major 
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multilateral treaties examined here, Switzerland has failed to ratify five treaties.  It has ratified 
only three treaties early and only four treaties in the middle of the ratification timeline.  Most 
frequently, Switzerland is the last or nearly the last OECD member to ratify treaties.  This clearly 
demonstrates that Switzerland, like the United States, is constrained in its treaty ratification 
abilities.  Though this conjecture requires further examination, Switzerland’s delayed or absent 
ratification can be reasonably attributed to Switzerland’s unique qualities.  In this way, 
Switzerland is a good comparison for the United States as it too demonstrates an outlier effect 
and aspects of exceptionalism.  This shows that ratification can be affected by unique domestic 
qualities. 
5.4 Ideology 
 
 The ideological component of treaty ratification in the United States is two-fold.  First, 
the majority party should be in agreement with the treaty.  While it would be possible for the 
minority party to garner enough support from the majority party in order to cross the two-thirds 
threshold, it would require the defection of a significant amount of the majority party.  This leads 
to the second component, the necessity of two thirds of the Senate agreeing on the treaty.  When 
one party barely has a majority and must gain the agreement of several opposition members, it 
would logically follow that the ratification threshold is raised.  If the majority party has close to a 
two-thirds majority it will be easier to achieve approval of ratification.  Ideologically, the 
Democratic Party is more inclined towards multilateral international cooperation and, therefore, 
would be more amenable to approval of major multilateral treaties.   
Eight treaties that remain unratified have been submitted to the Senate.  Five were 
submitted to a Democratic controlled Senate, two were submitted to a Republican controlled 
Senate, and one was submitted to an evenly split Senate.  If we accept the idea that presidents 
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usually prefer to introduce a treaty to a Senate that will approve ratification, this would appear to 
confirm the assumption that the Democrats are more inclined to approve ratification.  The two 
Republican controlled Senates that received treaty submissions were made up of 55 Republicans 
and 45 Democrats.  The Democrats would have to convince at least 22 Republicans to vote with 
them or the Republicans would need to sway at least 12 Democrats.  The Democratic controlled 
Senates that received treaty submissions ranged from 54 to 61 Democrats, meaning they would 
need to sway at least six to thirteen Republicans in order to approve the treaty.   
 The treaties submitted to Republican controlled Senates also have received their latest 
official action from a Republican controlled Senate.  The Senate composition for one treaty, the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, stayed the same.  For the other treaty, the Rotterdam 
Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and 
Pesticides in International Trade, Republicans lost three seats to Democrats and one to a third 
party.  The Senate environment for those two treaties was not favorable for ratification as 
Republicans are less ideologically inclined to support major multilateral treaties.  In fact, the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was rejected by the 55-45 Republican controlled 
Senate on October 13, 1999, about two years after it was submitted.  The Rotterdam Convention 
on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in 
International Trade was discussed for just over three years.  The treaty submitted to the split 
Senate, the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, was discussed for barely a 
year before a new Republican controlled Senate stalled it in the Committee on Foreign Relations.   
Of the five treaties submitted to Democratic controlled Senates, two received their last 
action from a reduced Democratic majority.  The International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights faced a Democratic majority that lost three seats a year and a half into 
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debate, going from 61 to 58 seats.  While the majority was still a strong one, when 67 votes are 
required, losing even three votes could have been costly.   The Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women was introduced to a 58-41 Democratic controlled 
Senate.  This treaty was extremely controversial and debated for over two decades before a split 
Senate consigned it to the Committee of Foreign Relations.  Even with the changing composition 
of the Senate from a Democratic majority to a Republican majority back to a Democratic 
controlled Congress, the Senate could not agree on approval of the treaty, demonstrating the 
difficulties imposed by the two-thirds majority requirement in treaty approval.   
Two of the treaties submitted to a Democratic majority received their latest action from a 
Senate of the same partisan make up.  The Convention on Biological Diversity was discussed for 
a year by a 57-43 Democratic controlled Senate and the Basel Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal was also discussed for 
about a year by a 56-44 Senate.  The conditions for ratification of these two treaties were fairly 
favorable, as they were received and discussed by unchanging Democratic controlled Senates 
that had to gain only 10-11 opposition votes, yet they were discussed for only a year.  The Basel 
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their 
Disposal was actually approved by the Senate on August 11, 1992.  In this case, the treaty did 
make it through the approval process and yet was not ratified, even though President George H. 
W. Bush both submitted and received the approval.  This is surprising because one would 
assume that if he would have ratified it when he received approval.  However, he received 
approval less than two months before the 1992 presidential elections, in which he was running 
for reelection.  This may have had an effect on his decision to ratify the treaty, especially if he 
thought ratification would cost him votes.  This treaty is discussed in depth in chapter seven. 
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 One treaty, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, was tabled by a Senate in 
which the Democratic Party had increased its representation from 54 to 56 since the submission 
of the treaty.  However, the treaty was still not approved after two and a half years of discussion.  
Like the previous two treaties, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties had favorable 
ideological conditions for ratification but was not approved.   
Four of the treaties were submitted to the Senate during a time of divided government.  
Two were submitted by a Democratic president to a Republican controlled Senate and two were 
submitted by a Republican president to a Democratic controlled Senate.  Logically, divided 
governments with a Republican president should be more inclined to approve and ratify treaties.  
If a president negotiates and introduces a treaty to the Senate he likely supports it, therefore his 
personal stance on the subject is already established in favor of the treaty and it is Congress’ 
support that needs to be secured.  The two treaties submitted to these more favorable divided 
governments were the Basel Convention, which will be further discussed in chapter seven, and 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  This treaty illustrates the real difficulty of 
approving a treaty in the United States, as even when there are favorable conditions for approval, 
treaties do not always make it through the Senate.   
6.  Ratified Treaties 
 
 In order to understand the American outlier effect, analysis of ratified treaties can shed 
light on the differences between ratified and unratified treaties.  The United States has ratified 20 
major multilateral treaties since the beginning of the United Nations.  The United States signed 
and ratified one treaty, the Constitution of the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization, but later withdrew from the treaty.  Due to its nature as a withdrawn ratification, 
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the Constitution of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization will not be included 
here.  The remaining 19 treaties are listed below. 
Treaty Year  Ratified 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961 1972 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 1963 1969 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948 1988 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 1966 1994 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 1992 
Convention against Torture and other Cruel and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment 1984 1994 
Convention on Psychotropic Substances 1971 1980 
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances 1988 1990 
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages 1979 1984 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against 
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents 1973 1976 
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 1997 2002 
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime 2000 2005 
United Nations Convention Against Corruption 2003 2006 
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious 
or to have Indiscriminate Effects 
1980 1995 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling 
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction 1992 1997 
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer 1985 1986 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 1987 1988 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992 1992 
United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries 
Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa 1994 2000 
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6.1 Subject Matter 
 
 The major multilateral treaties that the United States has ratified are spread across a 
diverse subject range, including human rights; privileges and immunities, diplomatic and 
consular relations, etc; narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances; penal matters; disarmament; 
and environment; While some categories, such as penal matters, are more favored in the group of 
treaties which have been ratified, in general there is not a difference in subject matter between 
the treaties which have been ratified by the United States and those that have not.  This indicates 
that overarching subject matter itself – the environment, disarmament, human rights, etc – does 
not have a large effect on whether or not the United States will ratify a treaty.   
6.2 Ideology 
 
 Of these 19 ratified major multilateral treaties, one was approved by a split Senate, seven 
were approved by a Republican controlled Senate, and eleven were approved by a Democratic 
controlled Senate.  This holds with the earlier suggestion that more liberal Senates are more 
likely to approve a treaty, though clearly more conservative Senates are not necessarily unlikely 
to issue approval.  Eleven of the treaties were approved and ratified by a split government.  Eight 
of the split governments were composed of a Republican president and a Democratic Senate, 
while the remaining three had a Democratic president and a Republican Senate.  This suggests 
that in a split government, the level of liberalism in the Senate is more important than that of the 
president, as postulated in the previous chapter.   
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6.3 Length of Debate 
 
 The length of time between a treaty’s submission to the U.N. Secretary General and 
ratification by the United States varies widely for the major multilateral treaties that the United 
States has ratified.  The shortest interval was just over five months for the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, which was introduced by a Republican president, 
President George H. W. Bush, after the treaty’s official recognition by the United Nations on 
May 9, 1992 and officially ratified on October 15, 1992 with the approval of a Democratic 
controlled Senate.  This remarkably quick ratification may have been driven by a complete 
consensus on the importance of battling climate change, although the United States did not even 
submit the subsequent Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change to the Senate for approval.  However, the speed with which this treaty was ratified may 
not be tied to its subject entirely.  In November 1992 both President George H. W. Bush and one 
third of the senators in the Democratic-controlled Senate were up for reelection.  Facing the 
election may have sped up the Senate’s consideration of the treaty, either because the senators 
believed approval would help their reelection chances or because they were afraid the new 
Senate would not approve the treaty.  The circumstances surrounding the ratification of this 
outlier treaty are explored in the following chapter. 
 The longest time period between U.N. recognition and United States ratification of a 
treaty occurred with the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, which took almost 40 years to be ratified by the United States from the time it was 
deposited with the Secretary General of the United Nations on December 9, 1948.  It was finally 
ratified after approval by a Democratic controlled Senate on November 25, 1988.   
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 The rest of the ratified treaties range from one year to 28 years of time elapsed before 
ratification occurred.  The average time for ratification, from the time of the treaty’s submission 
to the United Nations to official ratification by the United States, is about nine and a half years.  
This is a much shorter time period than those that have elapsed for the treaties that have not been 
ratified.  The major multilateral treaties in the Senate that are waiting for approval have been 
open for ratification for an average of around 23 years, ranging from 11 years for Stockholm 
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants to 46 years for the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.  This suggests that, in general, treaties are more likely to 
be ratified by the United States closer to their origination, rather than in later years.  However it 
is important to note that this is not an absolute rule, as seen with the Genocide Convention, 
which was ratified after 40 years.     
6.4 Accession to Treaties 
 
 The United States has indicated accession to four major multilateral treaties.  As earlier 
discussed, accession essentially indicates a desire to ratify but an inability to do so due to lack of 
signature.  Because often treaties have a limited time of availability for signature, usually until a 
treaty enters into force, a country may decide to become a party to the treaty after it has been 
closed for signatures and is therefore too late for ratification.  In the United States, the Senate 
proceeds with the treaty, once it has been submitted to the Senate, in the same manner as it 
proceeds with approval of ratification and will issue an approval of ratification if it agrees with 
the treaty, even though technically the president can only indicate accession to the treaty and not 
ratification.  For this reason I have included the treaties to which the United States has acceded 
but kept them separate from the ratified treaties for the sake of distinction.  For one treaty, the 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, ratification was not an 
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option for any country, likely due to the timing of the treaty in the early days of the United 
Nations, and all parties to the convention have either indicated accession or succeeded to that 
treaty.  The treaties are as follows: 
Treaty Year Accession 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations  1946 1970 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961 1967 
Convention on the Political Rights of Women 1953 1976 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitrary Awards 1958 1970 
  
 For these treaties, the time between declaration of the treaty and accession ranges from 
six years, for the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, to 24 years for the Convention on the 
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.  The average time period is 16.25 years, though 
this is clearly heavily influenced by the 23 and 24 years periods due to a small data pool.  
Regardless, accession to treaties appears to take longer than ratification.  Accession only occurs 
when a country decides to move forward with ratification after a treaty has been closed for 
signatures.  Because these treaties are acceded to rather than ratified, it follows logically that the 
time from creation to accession would take longer than the time for ratification.  However, 
accession may indicate that the United States hesitated before moving forward with the 
ratification process, which may be a result of a more controversial treaty that also required longer 
debate and consideration.  Though the average time period of a treaty with United States 
accession is longer than that of a treaty with United States ratification, the accession time period 
is still shorter than the average time for the treaties that have been submitted to the Senate but not 
ratified, upholding the postulation that the more time that passes the less likely a treaty is to be 
ratified.    
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7.  Case studies 
 
 While the previous sections show some of the effects of different aspects of American 
exceptionalism, they do not provide a picture of how the components work together to affect 
treaty ratification.  This section will explore two treaties in an attempt to understand how the 
historical, cultural, and institutional differences in the United States shaped the discussion and 
ratification of the treaties.  These two major multilateral treaties were both introduced and 
supported by President George H. W. Bush and discussed by the 102nd Senate during the same 
time period.  The Senate consented to ratification of both treaties, but only one treaty, the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, was ratified.  This section explores these 
two treaties and explanations for the different results.   
7.1 Background 
 
 During the 102nd Congress, two treaties were introduced to Congress by President George 
H. W. Bush – the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and their Disposal and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.  
The treaties were submitted to Congress in 1991 and 1992 respectively.  The government was 
divided, with a Republican president and a Democratic controlled Senate where the Democrats 
had a solid majority of 56.  Both treaties came to a vote in 1992 and consent to ratification was 
granted by Congress.  However, only one treaty, the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, was ultimately ratified, on October 15, 1992 by President George H. W. Bush.1  
                                                             
1 Library of Congress: THOMAS. <http://thomas.loc.gov>. 
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The Basel Convention has yet to be ratified, 20 years later, though consent to ratification of that 
treaty also was approved by the Senate in 1992.1   
 In addition to these two treaties, the Bush administration was also negotiating the 
Biodiversity Treaty.  The Biodiversity Treaty and the U.N.  Framework Convention on Climate 
Change were a pair of treaties discussed at the U.N.  Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.  In 
1992 the United States under President Bush had refused to sign the Biodiversity Treaty because 
the administration believed it would interfere with intellectual property rights in the United 
States as it “obligates countries…to conserve, sustainably use, and guarantee access to genetic 
resources.”2  President Bill Clinton signed the treaty during his tenure, but it was not ratified and 
in fact the only action Congress took was to release a statement about the necessity of specific 
language explaining the United States’ interpretation of that treaty.3  However, at the time of 
discussion of the two treaties examined here, the United States had not signed the Biodiversity 
Treaty, which may have had a strengthening impact on the willingness of the United States 
government to approve and ratify the other environmental treaty discussed at the U.N Earth 
Summit, the Framework Convention on Climate Change.   
In 1992 the country was suffering from unemployment and recession.  Unemployment 
was above seven percent in November 1992.  Historically, in four of the five U.S. elections when 
unemployment was above six percent, the president’s party was not reelected to the presidency 
and this surely was not lost on President Bush.4  In November of 1992, President Bush ran for 
reelection against Bill Clinton and Ross Perot and lost.  While these two treaties were being 
                                                             
1 Library of Congress: THOMAS. 
2 Charles R. McManis. "The Interface between International Intellectual Property and Environmental Protection: 
Biodiversity Treaty and Biotechnology." Washington University Law Quarterly 76.255 (1998). 260. 
 3 Charles R. McManis. "The Interface between International Intellectual Property and Environmental Protection: 
Biodiversity Treaty and Biotechnology."  
4 "Unemployment and Presidential Elections." The Washington Times. 25 May 2008. 
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discussed, the election was looming in the distance, with the added pressure of recession and 
unemployment affecting Bush’s reelection prospects.   
7.2 U.N.  Framework Convention on Climate Change 
 
 The United States signed the U.N.  Framework Convention on Climate Change on June 
12, 1992 at the U.N.  Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.1 The convention was fueled by 
concerns over carbon dioxide and greenhouse gas emissions.2  On September 8, 1992 President 
Bush submitted the treaty to the Senate and it was referred to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations.3  In his letter to the Senate, President Bush stated that the convention “represents a 
delicate balance of many interests” expressed at the Rio Summit.4 He encouraged prompt 
ratification by the United States because he believed it would encourage other countries to also 
ratify the treaty.5 The State Department report that accompanied the president’s letter agreed and 
included that timely ratification was important to show the United States’ commitment to 
preventing climate change.  It also confirmed that ratification would be consistent with the 
United States’ environmental and economic interests and foreign policy.6 
                                                             
1 Library of Congress: THOMAS.; Los Angeles Times. "Senate Approves Rio Treaty." Buffalo News Oct 08 1992: 
A.9. 
2 Los Angeles Times. "Senate Approves Rio Treaty."  
3 Library of Congress: THOMAS. 
4 United States Senate. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: message from the President of 
the United States transmitting the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted 
May 9, 1992. 102nd Congress. 2nd session. Washington: GPO, 1992. 
5 United States Senate. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: message from the President of 
the United States transmitting the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted 
May 9, 1992.  
6 United States Senate. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: message from the President of 
the United States transmitting the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted 
May 9, 1992. 
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 On September 18, 1992 the Committee on Foreign Relations held a hearing about the 
treaty.1  The main issues that arose during the hearing were global warming, the economic effect 
of the treaty, the United States being obligated to observe specific timelines and limits, and the 
need for the United States to be a party to the convention and a leader on the issue.  Experts in 
the field of global warming expressed concerns that the treaty was not strict enough to fully 
address the problem, but conceded that while it “guarantees nothing,” it would open the door for 
further action on the issue and should therefore be ratified.2  Their base assumption, that global 
warming was a serious problem, received some opposition, especially from the ranking 
Republican member, Senator McConnell, who maintained that “there is no conclusive evidence 
of significant long-term global warming”.3 Senator McConnell also expressed concerns about the 
economic consequences of the treaty and was joined by others who agreed that it was important 
to look first toward economic growth.  Given the economic climate and level of unemployment 
at the time, these concerns were to be expected.  However, several others, including experts and 
Democrats, argued that green technology would create jobs that were sorely needed.4   
Concerns about the United States being bound to specific goals and timelines were 
prevalent during the hearing.  For example, Senator McConnell advised some clarifications from 
the committee to confirm that the United States would not be bound to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions.5  Time tables and targets were a large issue of contention throughout the hearing, with 
                                                             
1 United States Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Hearing, U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(Treaty Doc. 102-38). 102nd Congress. 2nd Session. Washington: GPO, 1993.  
2 United States Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Hearing, U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(Treaty Doc. 102-38). 
3 United States Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Hearing, U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(Treaty Doc. 102-38). 
4 United States Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Hearing, U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(Treaty Doc. 102-38). 
5 United States Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Hearing, U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(Treaty Doc. 102-38). 
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most Democrats and experts supporting them and most Republicans opposing them.1  William K.  
Reilly, an administrator at the Environmental Protection Agency, commented that prompt 
ratification would not threaten the economy and instead actually would help it because the 
United States was already in compliance with the treaty.2  The general consensus of the hearing 
was that ratification was important to show the United States’ commitment to the issue and to 
continue being a world leader in environmental matters.3  Criticism from the world community 
was cited, condemning the United States’ actions at the summit in Rio, attacking the United 
States for acting in its own interests and not the interests of the world.  While some of the 
criticism was clearly intended to defer blame from the source, the sentiment was wide-spread at 
the summit.4 
 A major theme of the hearing was the upcoming election, which at that point was less 
than two months away.  At the summit there was criticism of the United States looking toward its 
own elections rather than the issue at hand.5  Reilly commented that much of the hearing was 
unrelated to the convention and that reviewing what happened at the summit, which comprised a 
significant portion of the hearing, was only a political maneuver.  Senator Gore (D), who would 
become vice president in 1993, boldly stated that the importance of the treaty “was lost” on 
President Bush and that the American citizens at the conference were “disappointed” because 
their voices were drowned out by the international outrage at the Bush administration’s actions at 
                                                             
1 United States Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Hearing, U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(Treaty Doc. 102-38). 
2 United States Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Hearing, U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change 
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the summit.1 He blamed President Bush for the lack of legally binding commitments in the 
treaty, pointedly attacked his knowledge of technology, and accused him of relying “on analyses 
that have been widely criticized and discredited.”2  Senator McConnell retorted that Senator 
Gore’s views were either a “hallucination” or a “nightmare” and that Americans were not 
embarrassed by the president’s actions at the summit.3  He used strong words throughout his 
support of the president’s actions and attacked the Democrats stating, “in this year of 
sloganeering and poll watching, it may be an irresistible urge to gloss over the facts, and smear 
prudent policies in favor of environmental extremism,” upholding his doubt about the real impact 
of climate change.4 
 On October 1, 1992 the Committee on Foreign Relations ordered the treaty to be reported 
“without amendment favorably” to the Senate as a whole.5  In the report the committee expressed 
the belief that approval and ratification would encourage other states to ratify, though the 
committee was not certain that the convention fully addressed the problem of global warming. 
The committee also took this opportunity to reaffirm some of the Senate’s constitutional rights.  
First, it asserted that Senate approval was necessary for any timetables or targets proposed by the 
executive branch or the Conference of the Parties to the treaty.  It also condemned the current 
trend of inhibiting the attachment of reservations to treaty ratification, as the Senate has the 
constitutional right to attach reservations where it sees fit.6   
                                                             
1 United States Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Hearing, U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(Treaty Doc. 102-38). 
2 United States Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Hearing, U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(Treaty Doc. 102-38). 
3 United States Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Hearing, U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change 
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4 United States Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Hearing, U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change 
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 The Senate discussed the treaty and passed a resolution consenting to ratification in a 
division vote.1  Most of the Senators who spoke during the discussion approved of ratification.  
As in committee, on the floor of the Senate the treaty debate was used as an election issue, with 
Senator McConnell continuing his praise of the president’s actions and Senator Gore further 
attacking the president’s work at the summit.2  The economic issues from the committee hearing 
were raised again.  Senator McConnell stated that his earlier concerns about the economic 
consequences of the treaty had been resolved and Senator Baucus (D) added that green 
technology would in fact create more jobs rather than eliminate them.3  On the topic of 
timetables and targets, the senators were still split on party lines.  Senators Pell (D) and Biden 
(D) supported the inclusion of timetables and targets while Senators McConnell, Simpson (R), 
and Craig (R) opposed any specific guarantee.  Many senators present, including Senators 
Baucus, Mitchell (D), Gore, and Biden, agreed that the treaty could have done more and should 
have been better but that it was a good foundation and a start toward resolving the issue of 
climate change.4   
 The 102nd Congress adjourned the next day, on October 8, presumably so the senators 
and congressmen up for reelection could return home to campaign.5  Upon the Senate’s approval 
of ratification, Reilly expressed his pleasure with the rapid approval and the fact the United 
States would be the first industrial nation to ratify the treaty, fulfilling the need discussed in the 
hearing to be a leader in this area.6  President Bush submitted the instrument of ratification on 
                                                             
1 In a division vote, unlike a roll call vote, individual votes are not recorded. Those in favor of the vote simply stand 
in their place and are counted, then those against stand to be counted. The prevailing side is announced, but 
the margin of victory is not. 
2 Congressional Record. “Framework Convention on Climate Change.” 102nd Congress (October 7, 1992) S17150-6.  
3 Congressional Record. “Framework Convention on Climate Change.” 
4 Congressional Record. “Framework Convention on Climate Change.” 
5 Congressional Record. 8 October 1992.  
6 Los Angeles Times. "Senate Approves Rio Treaty."  
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October 15, 1992 and the United States became a party to the U.N. Framework Convention on 
Climate Change a mere 125 days after signing the treaty.1   
7.3 Basel Convention 
 
 The United States signed the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal on March 22, 1990 in Basel, Switzerland.2  
The treaty was prompted by economic concerns regarding the methods of transportation and 
disposal of different wastes, most of which were unregulated at the time.  President Bush 
submitted the treaty to the Senate on May 17, 1991, over a year after signing it.3  In his letter 
accompanying the submission of the treaty, he stated that the United States was one of the first 
countries in the world to have legislation restricting exports of hazardous wastes, and he 
recommended that the Senate consent to ratification. He also announced that even before signing 
the treaty, his administration began to “seek statutory authority to ban exports of hazardous 
wastes” and that legislation that would bring the United States’ current laws into compliance 
with the treaty had already been sent to Congress.4  The State Department report that 
accompanied the president’s letter expressed support for the treaty because the United States 
“has long supported” the intent and purpose of the treaty and encouraged rapid ratification so 
                                                             
1 United Nations Treaty Collection.  
2 United Nations Treaty Collection.  
3 Library of Congress: THOMAS. 
4 United States Senate. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and 
their Disposal: message from the President of the United States transmitting the Basel Convention on the 
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, with annexes, done at 
Basel on March 22, 1989.  102nd Congress. 1st session. Washington: GPO, 1991. 
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trade would not be disrupted.1  It included four understandings recommended to be included in 
the final resolution of approval of ratification.   
In order to ratify the treaty, however, the United States needed to make changes in the 
domestic laws.  First, new or changed laws needed to create the authority for the United States to 
prohibit shipments of wastes when it believes the receiving nation will improperly handle the 
wastes.  Second, the United States’ definition of hazardous waste needed to include household 
wastes and ash from the incineration of wastes among other types of waste described in the 
treaty.  Last, in cases where waste is illegally transported and disposed of by private parties the 
United States needed the authority to take charge of these wastes.2 
On May 20, 1991 the Basel Convention was sent to the Committee on Foreign Relations 
but the hearing was not held until nearly 10 months later on March 12, 1992.3  For the most part, 
the senators and experts involved in the hearing agreed on the necessity of action on the issue of 
control of hazardous materials and believed that this treaty was a good beginning to the solution.  
Senator Pell voiced the opinion that there was a definite need for control of hazardous materials.  
Richard J.  Smith from the Environmental Protection Agency agreed that the treaty was a good 
solution to a serious problem and would only serve to strengthen protection in the United States 
because the treaty was broader than the U.S. legislation at the time.4  The only voice of serious 
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criticism was that of Jim Vallette from Greenpeace, who criticized President Bush for preventing 
this treaty from being strong, although he did admit that, because the treaty would require closer 
monitoring in the United States, it would be good for the country.1    
One of the main concerns expressed in the hearing was the consequences of not ratifying.  
Senator Baucus communicated his hope that the United States would continue the leadership 
position that it took during the negotiations.  Smith from the EPA supported quick ratification 
because the convention would enter into force on May 5, 1992 and the states parties would 
convene shortly thereafter to establish the technical guidelines for the “sound management of 
wastes,” an opinion strongly supported by Harvey Alter from the Chamber of Commerce and 
John Bullock from the International Precious Metals Institute.2 Again Vallette from Greenpeace 
was alone in his view that it would be better for the world if the United States was not a party 
and could not be involved in these important discussions.3  
The issue of trade was prevalent during the hearing, as numerous participants voiced their 
concern about the effects of not being a party to the treaty.  Smith explained that unless the 
United States had a bilateral agreement with a state, if that state were a party to the treaty the 
United States would not be able to trade as easily, or possibly trade at all, with it.4  This was a 
serious concern for both Alter and Bullock, who was especially worried about the effect the 
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treaty would have on the trade of precious metals, as the wastes of that commodity would be 
governed by the convention.1  
The necessity of implementing legislation was a central part of the debate surrounding 
the Basel Convention.  Because the convention is non-self executing, the United States needed to 
change the current laws or pass new legislation in order to be in compliance with the treaty.2 As 
stated in President Bush’s letter of submission, efforts to address this necessity began even 
before the treaty was finalized.  The issue of implementing legislation had two parts: what it 
should be and when it should be passed.  Congressman Synar (D) expressed the need for tough 
implementation language and Senator Baucus stressed the importance of addressing the specific 
aspects of the law that needed to be modified instead of merely duplicating the treaty in new 
legislation.3  Congressman Synar promoted his own bill, the Waste Export Control Act, as a 
solution, criticizing the Bush administration’s bill for having vague definitions, weak provisions, 
and exempting Canada and Mexico, which were the recipients of over 90% of American exports 
of hazardous wastes.4  
The hearing participants disagreed about when the implementing legislation needed to be 
passed, however.  Senator Baucus said he believed the legislation could and should swiftly 
follow ratification, rather than precede it, in order to avoid infringing on the Senate’s right to 
approve ratification of treaties; Alter agreed with him.5  Smith believed that the legislation was 
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necessary before official ratification because the language of the treaty was much broader than 
that of the domestic legislation, and Congressman Synar, predictably, was in favor of passing his 
own bill before ratifying the treaty.1 
On May 7, 1992 the Committee on Foreign Relations ordered the Basel Convention to be 
reported to the Senate and it was reported with understandings on May 28.2 The report 
recommended approval in order to stop “damaging effects on public health, the environment, and 
foreign regulations” and expounded upon the need for domestic legislation already explained by 
the State Department and during the hearing.3  The Committee recommended the same four 
understandings that the State Department originally submitted with the treaty, which are included 
in Appendix 2.  The first understanding upholds the necessity of respecting the sovereign 
immunity of appropriate vessels under the convention.  The second pertains to the definition of a 
“state of transit” under Article 2 of the convention and is intended to avoid conflict between the 
convention and the law of the sea.4  The third is applicable to Article 4(9)(a) which limits export 
of hazardous waste to situations in which the exporting country “does not have the technical 
capacity and the necessary facilities, capacity or suitable disposal sites.” This understanding 
declares that the United States will take the cost of both domestic and international disposal into 
consideration when determining the possibility of exporting waste, rather than only exporting 
when internal disposal is impossible.5  The final understanding explains the United States’ 
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interpretation of cleanup obligations in an attempt to avoid “costly and politically sensitive” 
cleanup requirements.1 
Ratification of the Basel Convention received advice and consent by the Senate in a 
division vote on August 11, 1992.2  However, to this date, the treaty has not been ratified.  The 
main reason for this is that the implementing legislation necessary for ratification has never been 
enacted.  Though numerous pieces of legislation have been proposed and discussed, none have 
been passed, mostly due to disagreements over specific standards for the export and disposal of 
the hazardous wastes.3   
President George H. W. Bush’s administration had two strong motivations for rapid 
ratification of the convention.  The first, voiced in the State Department report and the hearing 
before the Committee on Foreign Relations, was the concern that the United States’ lack of party 
status would interfere with existing trade with countries that were parties to the convention.  The 
United States already had bilateral agreements with Canada and Mexico, and was pursuing 
similar agreements within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, but 
would be prevented or hindered in exporting wastes to other countries that ratified the 
convention.  Additionally, party status would include the United States in subsequent 
conferences and give it a voice in further developments.4   
Despite the administration’s strong motivation to ratify the convention quickly, 
implementing legislation failed to pass during President Bush’s tenure due to political 
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disagreements between Democrats in Congress and the Bush administration.  Congressional 
Democrats, seizing the opportunity to advance their own agendas on the White House, pushed 
for a reauthorization of all domestic environmental law, while the Bush administration preferred 
to revisit only those parts necessary to be in compliance with the treaty.   
Three major pieces of implementing legislation were introduced during the Bush 
administration – the Waste Export and Import Prohibition Act (WEIPA), the Waste Export 
Control Act (WECA), and the Hazardous and Additional Waste Export and Import Act (HWEI).  
WEIPA imposed a comprehensive ban on imports and exports, as introduced by Congressman 
Towns (D).  It failed due to serious disagreements over most of its provisions and the belief that 
it likely created more problems than it solved.1  WECA, as previously discussed, was introduced 
by Congressman Synar.  It established the extraterritorial jurisdiction of United States laws and 
standards, essentially forcing countries importing from the United States to adopt U.S. laws, 
which would not have been received well internationally. 2  The Bush administration’s bill, 
HWEI, required only that importing states handle waste in an “environmentally sound” manner, 
but this in turn was criticized for not forcing the importing states to comply with United States 
laws.3  A major impediment to the passage of these bills was that neither side was willing to 
compromise.  For example, a proposal of blanket bans was dismissed for being too strong; the 
proposal of broad bans was rejected for not being a blanket ban.  Similarly, legislators could not 
agree on whether or not extraterritorial jurisdiction should be included in the legislation.   
When President Bill Clinton took office, he proposed a Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA) scaled-down reauthorization bill as a way to achieve implementation 
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quickly.1  HR 3706 was sponsored by Congressman Towns and was very similar to WEIPA with 
the difference that it included a wide spectrum of bans rather than a blanket ban on exports.  It 
was also introduced in 1993 but was not passed.2  In a message from the White House at the end 
of February 1993, the Clinton administration announced introduction of a bill that would be an 
important step toward ratification.3 Unfortunately, the president’s bill coincided with the Second 
Conference of the Basel Convention, where the parties to the treaty approved the Ban 
Amendment.  This amendment banned any waste export or import between OECD states and 
non-OECD states and upon the Second Conference’s approval of this amendment, the United 
States Department of Commerce withdrew its support for the treaty.4  After the implementation 
of the Ban Amendment by the parties to the treaty, Congress ceased discussion on ratification of 
the treaty.  Though it would be possible to submit a reservation regarding the Ban Amendment 
that would exempt the United States, many government leaders and environmentalists felt this 
would undermine the purpose of the convention.5   
President Clinton did not abandon the idea of ratifying the Basel Convention, instead 
promising in 1999 that the implementing legislation would be passed before the end of the 103rd 
Congress.6  However, this ultimately did not happen.  This failure may have occurred because of 
the Protocol on Liability and Compensation, which was added to the convention in December of 
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that same year.1  The Protocol most importantly imposes liability on parties who fail to comply 
with the convention.  As a protocol, it requires ratification separate from the treaty itself, but the 
United States is traditionally wary of treaties and agreements that impose liability on parties.2 
In 2000, new members of Congress and President George W. Bush were sworn in and 
ratification efforts continued to lose steam.  The United States submitted a comment on the Basel 
Convention Strategic Plan in 2009.3  In it, the United States affirmed that it was acting 
“generally” in compliance with the treaty and still hoped to implement legislation that would 
allow ratification of the treaty.  However, in this statement, the United States was far more 
critical of the convention than it had previously been, stating that the convention was not up to 
date with modern situations, and suggesting that other organizations, such as the OECD, had 
done much more to solve problems related to the export of hazardous wastes than the Basel 
Convention.4  
Though the United States is not a party to the Basel Convention and has not managed to 
pass the implementing legislation, the State Department “currently maintains that, in practice, the 
U.S. adheres to the Basel Convention in its entirety.”5  The United States also still has bilateral 
agreements with Canada and Mexico which cover almost all of the U.S.’s export of hazardous 
wastes.  Legislation updating United States laws to be in compliance with the treaty has not been 
voted on in Congress since 1994, and the existence of both the Ban Amendment and the Protocol 
                                                             
1 Sejal Choksi. "The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their 
Disposal: 1999 Protocol on Liability and Compensation." 
2 Sejal Choksi. "The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their 
Disposal: 1999 Protocol on Liability and Compensation." 
3 Unfortunately, this comment is not dated. It must have been submitted after March 30,2009, as it is filled under 
comments submitted after that date and before June 2009, as that date is cited as a future date at which 
more information will be provided. 
4 “U.S. Comments on the Developments and Obstacles in the Implementation of the Basel Convention Strategic 
Plan.” <http://www.basel.int/Portals/4/Basel%20Convention/docs/stratplan/dev-obst/comments/us-e.pdf>. 
5 Mark Bradford. "The United States, China, and the Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movement of 
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal." 329. 
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have cost the treaty a great deal of support within the American political system.1  Currently the 
treaty remains unratified by the United States. 
7.4 Conclusions  
 
 Though these two treaties were being discussed in Congress at the same time, and both 
were in fact approved by the Senate, only one was ratified.  Ironically, the treaty that was signed 
and submitted later in the congressional session, the Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
was rapidly approved by Congress, while the Basel Convention stagnated between approval and 
ratification due to failure to pass the necessary implementing legislation.   
Congress reached a general agreement to ratify the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change before the Committee on Foreign Relations even held a hearing.  For the most part the 
discussion was divided along party lines.  Democrats urged further action, argued that the treaty 
would ultimately help the economy, and supported the idea that it was incredibly important for 
the United States to be a party. Congressional Republicans pushed for no binding agreements to 
timetables, worried about economic repercussions, and questioned the real importance of climate 
change.  Though many involved debated the details and effects of the Framework Convention, 
President George H. W. Bush, the United States State Department, the Senate, and various 
experts all agreed that the United States should ratify the treaty.  However, most parties involved 
in Basel Convention debates also supported ratification, acknowledging that the treaty was a 
good step in solving this ecological problem, and agreed that it was important for the United 
States to be a party to the treaty in order to maintain leadership and trade,.  While ratification of 
the Framework Convention was strongly supported by the president, Congress and experts, as 
                                                             
1 Sejal Choksi. "The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their 
Disposal: 1999 Protocol on Liability and Compensation." 
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ratification of the Basel Convention enjoyed similar agreement throughout the process, such an 
agreement does not in itself explain the Framework Convention’s quick approval.   
 One factor that appeared to affect the speed at which the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change was ratified was the upcoming election.  Congress adjourned just one day after 
approving it and President Bush did not delay before submitting the United States’ official 
ratification.  The debates about the treaty were used as elections tools, with members of both 
parties toeing the party line in solidarity.  The Republicans likely hoped to keep the presidency 
and regain as much of Congress as possible, while the Democrats hoped to win the White House 
and maintain a stronghold over Congress.  It is possible that the need to support the president so 
close to the election motivated more Republican senators to support the treaty than might have 
earlier in the year.  While this election effect might have carried over to the Basel Convention’s 
implementing legislation, it did not.  Instead, the election affected the legislation in another way, 
with the Democratic controlled Congress rejecting the Republican president’s bill in the lead up 
to the election.  Democrats in Congress wanted a reauthorization of the entirety of environmental 
law and used the president’s publicly stated support for ratification to attempt to force his hand.  
 That the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was passed so 
quickly appears to suggest that rapid ratification is easily achievable, contrary to the premise of 
this paper.  However, it is incredibly rare for a treaty to be ratified so quickly; in fact, the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change was ratified faster than any other major multilateral 
treaty in United States history.  As shown in the table and explained in chapter six, the United 
States’ ratification period for major multilateral treaties ranges from less than one year to 28 
years, with an average time of about nine and a half years.  The Framework Convention was 
clearly an anomaly.  The impending election, approaching recess, and desire of both parties and 
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both branches to take electoral credit for ratifying the treaty created a unique circumstance that 
has not been repeated since.   
The looming election was not strong enough motivation to push through the 
implementing legislation necessary to ratify the Basel Convention.  One reason for this is that the 
legislation became an election issue between the two parties and divided the legislative and 
executive branches.  However, even after the election, the United States continued to have 
difficulty ratifying the convention due to the now protracted ratification process. 
In 1993, Democratic President Bill Clinton took office and was also unable to strike an 
agreement on implementing legislation.  Two major factors blocked the legislation.  First, the 
players involved could not agree on what the definitions and technicalities in the legislation 
should be.  One bill did not pass because it imposed United States’ standards on other countries, 
while the next bill was criticized for not imposing those standards.  Both broad bans and blanket 
bans were rejected.  The second factor was the changes to the convention, namely the Ban 
Amendment and the Protocol, which turned many key domestic actors against the treaty.  After 
the Ban Amendment, Congress ceased to discuss implementing legislation and the Department 
of Commerce pulled its support for the convention.  After the Protocol, more government and 
ecological leaders were disinclined to support the treaty due to American reluctance toward its 
imposition of liability.   
 Though the United States, as recently as 2009, has confirmed its desire to pass 
implementing legislation and ratify the treaty, it does not appear to be a priority anymore.  The 
argument for rapid ratification is no longer valid as most of the important decisions were long 
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ago made without the United States.1  Furthermore, the United States has bilateral agreements 
that cover up to 97% of applicable waste exports and does not need the treaty to continue that 
trade.  The ratification of the treaty appears unlikely now due to these factors.   
This clearly illustrates that something other than disagreement with the treaty’s 
provisions has prevented the United States from ratifying.  Institutionally, divided government 
made conflicting goals between the executive branch and the legislative branch possible, as seen 
in the legislature’s attempt to use ratification of the treaty as leverage to force reauthorization of 
all environmental law.  The system also made it possible for the legislature to easily reject the 
president’s bills, a move much more daring and difficult in a parliamentary system.  
Furthermore, the delays caused by institutional structure increased the difficulty of ratifying the 
treaty, as intervening changes had been made to the original agreement without the United 
States’ input.  Had implementing legislation not been necessary, the Basel Convention may have 
been ratified before the major changes had been made to the convention.   
The United States has a history of unease toward outside intervention, which resulted in 
the necessity for implementing legislation in order to ratify treaties.  Culturally and historically, 
the United States has also had qualms about ratifying a treaty without support from important 
leaders throughout both the government and the environmental sector.  The discomfort with a 
liability protocol is directly related to the American tradition of independence and freedom from 
unnecessary regulation as it could have subjected the United States to liability for actions by a 
private U.S. company.  In the end it was a combination of all three aspects – culture, history, and 
institutions – of American exceptionalism that led to the failure to ratify the Basel Convention. 
                                                             
1 Sejal Choksi. "The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their 
Disposal: 1999 Protocol on Liability and Compensation." 
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8.  Conclusion  
 
The concept of American exceptionalism is a better explanation for lack of ratification 
than that of American arrogance.  Domestic qualities often constrain a state’s ability to act 
internationally, and instead of ignoring the United States’ domestic constraints, those who 
criticize the United States’ ratification record should consider the effect domestic qualities have 
on ratification.  The United States, from the 1770s, has been vastly different from other 
countries.  Today its historical, cultural, and institutional characteristics continue to set it apart 
from most other modern, developed democracies.  The combination of these characteristics, or 
American exceptionalism, greatly constrains the United States’ ability to ratify treaties. 
In reality, the United States has ratified many multilateral treaties, so the base of the 
arrogance accusation is not entirely accurate.  However, it is true that the U.S. has ratified fewer 
treaties than other western, developed states.  This is not due to a lack of concern for 
international cooperation but rather often as a result of domestic constraints.  While the United 
States of course occasionally does not pursue ratification because it does not agree with the terms 
of a particular treaty, usually lack of ratification of a major multilateral treaty indicates a 
technical problem rather than disinclination toward compliance.  It is widely accepted that 
domestic constraints do affect a country’s ability to ratify treaties, and the United States has a 
unique set of domestic constraints.  Those who have always lived in the United States may not 
realize how different the country is from other developed states and conversely, those who have 
never lived in the United States may also have trouble recognizing the differences.  
Alone, the individual institutions do not seem to always hinder ratification, as seen when 
compared with other OECD states.  However, the combined effect of bicameralism, federalism, 
74 
 
and presidentialism is difficult to measure as Switzerland and Mexico alone of OECD countries 
also possess those characteristics.  The overarching subject matter of a treaty (environment, 
human rights, etc.) does not appear to have an effect on whether or not the United States ratifies 
the treaty.  The ideological composition of the government does seem to affect ratification 
prospects, especially when combined with the institutional possibility of divided government. 
However, because treaties do not expire in the Senate, this does not necessarily preclude 
ratification and may merely delay it.  When combined with the cultural and historical traditions 
of popular support and nonregulation, among other things, as demonstrated with the failure to 
pass the implementing legislation necessary to ratify the Basel Convention, the aspects of 
American exceptionalism do appear to have a constraining effect on treaty ratification.   
The United States, unfortunately, has a bad reputation both internationally, and somewhat 
domestically, for not ratifying multilateral treaties.  One of the most popular explanations for the 
lack of ratification from the United States is that the country’s hegemonic status has bred an 
attitude of exemption from treaty ratification and compliance.  Various presidents, and the 
country as a whole, have been criticized for having this arrogant self-construct.  While America’s 
absence from multilateral treaties is not the only part of this criticism, mistaken views of why the 
United States has not ratified treaties do damage to our international relations and image.   
Because of this critical view, the United States faces difficulties both domestically and 
internationally.  Some citizens vilify the government or feel shame in being an American due to 
this poor reputation.  Internationally, in some negotiations other states may be less likely to 
compromise or enter into discussions with the United States because they take offense with the 
alleged hegemonic attitude of exemption.  It is unfortunate that a country that does a great deal of 
good in the world should be condemned by a view that disregards many alternative explanations. 
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 If those who currently criticize the United States for not ratifying treaties viewed the 
American outlier effect through the lens of American exceptionalism, there would be less 
animosity toward the United States.  While it is certainly not an all-encompassing explanation, it 
broadens the current favored explanation significantly and introduces the idea that there are 
alternative, fairer explanations available.  While the fact remains that the United States still does 
not ratify some treaties, a better understanding of why the United States sometimes struggles to 
ratify treaties would benefit both our international affairs and negotiations and our internal 
relations. 
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Appendix 1: OECD Ratification 
A1.1: Presidentialism 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Canada Estonia  Canada Canada Iceland Netherlands Sweden Hungary Sweden Sweden 
Mexico Japan Ireland Germany Norway United Kingdom Denmark Poland Poland France 
Norway Czech Republic Switzerland Sweden Austria Denmark Chile Mexico Portugal Chile 
Australia Slovakia Hungary Iceland Denmark Norway Norway Estonia Hungary Mexico 
New Zealand Austria Denmark Norway Finland Austria Germany  Mexico Portugal 
Sweden France Mexico Slovakia Germany Luxembourg Hungary  Norway Spain 
Denmark United Kingdom Austria Czech Republic Greece Sweden Finland  Canada Australia 
Germany Australia Norway Austria Ireland Chile Australia  Austria Norway 
Portugal Spain France Japan Italy Germany Canada  Denmark Poland 
Spain Germany Germany Luxembourg Luxembourg Finland United Kingdom  Greece Finland 
Hungary Sweden United Kingdom Mexico Mexico New Zealand Poland  Australia Denmark 
Italy Canada Belgium Switzerland Slovakia Belgium Spain  France Italy 
Luxembourg Denmark Slovenia Denmark Spain Japan Portugal  Spain Israel 
United Kingdom Finland Sweden Australia Sweden Ireland Austria  South Korea Hungary 
France Italy Australia Spain United Kingdom Hungary Italy  New Zealand Estonia 
Estonia New Zealand Spain New Zealand Slovenia Poland Netherlands  Italy South Korea 
Greece Netherlands New Zealand United Kingdom Hungary Spain New Zealand  Iceland Canada 
Austria Greece Portugal Chile Chile South Korea Japan  Japan Belgium 
Chile Poland Italy Greece Estonia Greece Iceland  Belgium United Kingdom 
Iceland Luxembourg Iceland Belgium Belgium Italy France  Germany Germany 
South Korea Belgium Luxembourg Slovenia South Korea Australia Mexico  Turkey Austria 
Switzerland Hungary Czech Republic  South Korea Poland Estonia Belgium  Ireland Ireland 
Israel Ireland Chile Hungary Canada France Luxembourg  United Kingdom Iceland 
Poland Norway Greece Poland New Zealand Iceland Greece  Finland New Zealand 
Ireland South Korea Turkey Estonia Switzerland  Ireland  Luxembourg Greece 
Slovenia Switzerland Estonia Turkey Israel  South Korea  Chile Luxembourg 
Belgium Mexico  Ireland Australia  Israel  Netherlands Japan 
Turkey Turkey   Turkey  Estonia  Israel Turkey 
 Iceland     Switzerland  Estonia Switzerland 
 Portugal     Turkey  Switzerland  
 Chile         
 Slovenia         
Accession indicated by italics 
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11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
Hungary Denmark Slovenia Canada Italy Mexico New Zealand Switzerland Denmark 
Spain Norway Czech Republic United Kingdom Norway Iceland Hungary Norway Japan 
Mexico Belgium Hungary New Zealand Iceland Australia Slovakia Mexico Sweden 
Slovenia Luxembourg Germany Spain Belgium Germany Mexico New Zealand Norway 
Australia Germany Switzerland Australia Canada Italy Iceland Sweden Australia 
Chile Australia  Canada Italy New Zealand Austria Australia Australia Finland 
New Zealand United Kingdom Austria Mexico Luxembourg Greece Canada Poland United Kingdom 
Austria France Italy Greece Spain South Korea Denmark Estonia Mexico 
South Korea Israel Luxembourg Sweden Germany France Germany Chile South Korea 
Sweden Sweden Belgium Denmark Austria Slovakia United Kingdom Canada Ireland 
Germany Austria South Korea South Korea Finland Japan Turkey Austria Switzerland 
Italy Italy New Zealand Finland France Czech Republic Spain Japan Austria 
United Kingdom Switzerland Sweden Austria Denmark Finland Finland Slovenia Canada 
Belgium Iceland Greece Chile Sweden Ireland Slovenia Belgium New Zealand 
Denmark Netherlands Denmark Japan United Kingdom Norway South Korea Portugal Spain 
Portugal Ireland Spain Netherlands Switzerland Sweden Chile Ireland Greece 
Czech Republic Greece Australia Hungary Poland Netherlands Luxembourg Italy Belgium 
Turkey New Zealand United Kingdom Germany Hungary New Zealand Sweden Luxembourg Germany 
France Portugal Chile Switzerland Slovenia Spain Estonia Spain Luxembourg 
Canada Turkey Mexico Poland Estonia United Kingdom Israel United Kingdom Portugal 
Slovakia Finland Ireland Estonia Portugal Chile Austria South Korea Turkey 
Luxembourg Canada Poland Belgium Ireland Portugal Belgium Turkey  
 Chile Estonia Luxembourg Slovakia Belgium Ireland Greece  
 Spain Slovakia Portugal Greece Poland Greece Israel  
 Japan  Ireland Australia Luxembourg Poland Germany  
 Hungary   South Korea Hungary Italy Iceland  
 Poland   Mexico Canada    
 South Korea   Japan Denmark    
 Estonia   Chile Estonia    
 Mexico   Czech Republic Switzerland    
Accession indicated by italics 
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A1.2: Federalism 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Canada Estonia  Canada Canada Iceland Netherlands Sweden Hungary Sweden Sweden 
Mexico Japan Ireland Germany Norway United Kingdom Denmark Poland Poland France 
Norway Czech Republic Switzerland Sweden Austria Denmark Chile Mexico Portugal Chile 
Australia Slovakia Hungary Iceland Denmark Norway Norway Estonia Hungary Mexico 
New Zealand Austria Denmark Norway Finland Austria Germany  Mexico Portugal 
Sweden France Mexico Slovakia Germany Luxembourg Hungary  Norway Spain 
Denmark United Kingdom Austria Czech Republic Greece Sweden Finland  Canada Australia 
Germany Australia Norway Austria Ireland Chile Australia  Austria Norway 
Portugal Spain France Japan Italy Germany Canada  Denmark Poland 
Spain Germany Germany Luxembourg Luxembourg Finland United Kingdom  Greece Finland 
Hungary Sweden United Kingdom Mexico Mexico New Zealand Poland  Australia Denmark 
Italy Canada Belgium Switzerland Slovakia Belgium Spain  France Italy 
Luxembourg Denmark Slovenia Denmark Spain Japan Portugal  Spain Israel 
United Kingdom Finland Sweden Australia Sweden Ireland Austria  South Korea Hungary 
France Italy Australia Spain United Kingdom Hungary Italy  New Zealand Estonia 
Estonia New Zealand Spain New Zealand Slovenia Poland Netherlands  Italy South Korea 
Greece Netherlands New Zealand United Kingdom Hungary Spain New Zealand  Iceland Canada 
Austria Greece Portugal Chile Chile South Korea Japan  Japan Belgium 
Chile Poland Italy Greece Estonia Greece Iceland  Belgium United Kingdom 
Iceland Luxembourg Iceland Belgium Belgium Italy France  Germany Germany 
South Korea Belgium Luxembourg Slovenia South Korea Australia Mexico  Turkey Austria 
Switzerland Hungary Czech Republic  South Korea Poland Estonia Belgium  Ireland Ireland 
Israel Ireland Chile Hungary Canada France Luxembourg  United Kingdom Iceland 
Poland Norway Greece Poland New Zealand Iceland Greece  Finland New Zealand 
Ireland South Korea Turkey Estonia Switzerland  Ireland  Luxembourg Greece 
Slovenia Switzerland Estonia Turkey Israel  South Korea  Chile Luxembourg 
Belgium Mexico  Ireland Australia  Israel  Netherlands Japan 
Turkey Turkey   Turkey  Estonia  Israel Turkey 
 Iceland     Switzerland  Estonia Switzerland 
 Portugal     Turkey  Switzerland  
 Chile         
 Slovenia         
Accession indicated by italics 
 
  
 
 
 
 
79
 
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
Hungary Denmark Slovenia Canada Italy Mexico New Zealand Switzerland Denmark 
Spain Norway Czech Republic United Kingdom Norway Iceland Hungary Norway Japan 
Mexico Belgium Hungary New Zealand Iceland Australia Slovakia Mexico Sweden 
Slovenia Luxembourg Germany Spain Belgium Germany Mexico New Zealand Norway 
Australia Germany Switzerland Australia Canada Italy Iceland Sweden Australia 
Chile Australia  Canada Italy New Zealand Austria Australia Australia Finland 
New Zealand United Kingdom Austria Mexico Luxembourg Greece Canada Poland United Kingdom 
Austria France Italy Greece Spain South Korea Denmark Estonia Mexico 
South Korea Israel Luxembourg Sweden Germany France Germany Chile South Korea 
Sweden Sweden Belgium Denmark Austria Slovakia United Kingdom Canada Ireland 
Germany Austria South Korea South Korea Finland Japan Turkey Austria Switzerland 
Italy Italy New Zealand Finland France Czech Republic Spain Japan Austria 
United Kingdom Switzerland Sweden Austria Denmark Finland Finland Slovenia Canada 
Belgium Iceland Greece Chile Sweden Ireland Slovenia Belgium New Zealand 
Denmark Netherlands Denmark Japan United Kingdom Norway South Korea Portugal Spain 
Portugal Ireland Spain Netherlands Switzerland Sweden Chile Ireland Greece 
Czech Republic Greece Australia Hungary Poland Netherlands Luxembourg Italy Belgium 
Turkey New Zealand United Kingdom Germany Hungary New Zealand Sweden Luxembourg Germany 
France Portugal Chile Switzerland Slovenia Spain Estonia Spain Luxembourg 
Canada Turkey Mexico Poland Estonia United Kingdom Israel United Kingdom Portugal 
Slovakia Finland Ireland Estonia Portugal Chile Austria South Korea Turkey 
Luxembourg Canada Poland Belgium Ireland Portugal Belgium Turkey  
 Chile Estonia Luxembourg Slovakia Belgium Ireland Greece  
 Spain Slovakia Portugal Greece Poland Greece Israel  
 Japan  Ireland Australia Luxembourg Poland Germany  
 Hungary   South Korea Hungary Italy Iceland  
 Poland   Mexico Canada    
 South Korea   Japan Denmark    
 Estonia   Chile Estonia    
 Mexico   Czech Republic Switzerland    
Accession indicated by italics 
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A1.3: Bicameralism 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Canada Estonia  Canada Canada Iceland Netherlands Sweden Hungary Sweden Sweden 
Mexico Japan Ireland Germany* Norway United Kingdom Denmark Poland Poland France 
Norway Czech Republic Switzerland* Sweden Austria Denmark Chile* Mexico Portugal Chile* 
Australia* Slovakia Hungary Iceland Denmark Norway Norway Estonia Hungary Mexico 
New Zealand Austria Denmark Norway Finland Austria Germany*  Mexico Portugal 
Sweden France Mexico Slovakia Germany* Luxembourg Hungary  Norway Spain 
Denmark United Kingdom Austria Czech Republic Greece Sweden Finland  Canada Australia* 
Germany* Australia* Norway Austria Ireland Chile* Australia*  Austria Norway 
Portugal Spain France Japan Italy* Germany* Canada  Denmark Poland 
Spain Germany* Germany* Luxembourg Luxembourg Finland United Kingdom  Greece Finland 
Hungary Sweden United Kingdom Mexico Mexico New Zealand Poland  Australia* Denmark 
Italy* Canada Belgium* Switzerland* Slovakia Belgium* Spain  France Italy* 
Luxembourg Denmark Slovenia Denmark Spain Japan Portugal  Spain Israel 
United Kingdom Finland Sweden Australia* Sweden Ireland Austria  South Korea Hungary 
France Italy Australia* Spain United Kingdom Hungary Italy*  New Zealand Estonia 
Estonia New Zealand Spain New Zealand Slovenia Poland Netherlands  Italy* South Korea 
Greece Netherlands New Zealand United Kingdom Hungary Spain New Zealand  Iceland Canada 
Austria Greece Portugal Chile* Chile* South Korea Japan  Japan Belgium* 
Chile* Poland Italy* Greece Estonia Greece Iceland  Belgium* United Kingdom 
Iceland Luxembourg Iceland Belgium* Belgium* Italy* France  Germany* Germany* 
South Korea Belgium* Luxembourg Slovenia South Korea Australia* Mexico  Turkey Austria 
Switzerland* Hungary Czech Republic  South Korea Poland Estonia Belgium*  Ireland Ireland 
Israel Ireland Chile* Hungary Canada France Luxembourg  United Kingdom Iceland 
Poland Norway Greece Poland New Zealand Iceland Greece  Finland New Zealand 
Ireland South Korea Turkey Estonia Switzerland*  Ireland  Luxembourg Greece 
Slovenia Switzerland* Estonia Turkey Israel  South Korea  Chile* Luxembourg 
Belgium* Mexico  Ireland Australia*  Israel  Netherlands Japan 
Turkey Turkey   Turkey  Estonia  Israel Turkey 
 Iceland     Switzerland*  Estonia Switzerland* 
 Portugal     Turkey  Switzerland*  
 Chile*         
 Slovenia         
Accession indicated by italics 
Strong bicameralism indicated by asterisk  
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11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
Hungary Denmark Slovenia Canada Italy* Mexico New Zealand Switzerland* Denmark 
Spain Norway Czech Republic United Kingdom Norway Iceland Hungary Norway Japan 
Mexico Belgium* Hungary New Zealand Iceland Australia* Slovakia Mexico Sweden 
Slovenia Luxembourg Germany* Spain Belgium* Germany* Mexico New Zealand Norway 
Australia* Germany* Switzerland* Australia* Canada Italy* Iceland Sweden Australia* 
Chile* Australia*  Canada Italy* New Zealand Austria Australia* Australia* Finland 
New Zealand United Kingdom Austria Mexico Luxembourg Greece Canada Poland United Kingdom 
Austria France Italy* Greece Spain South Korea Denmark Estonia Mexico 
South Korea Israel Luxembourg Sweden Germany* France Germany* Chile* South Korea 
Sweden Sweden Belgium* Denmark Austria Slovakia United Kingdom Canada Ireland 
Germany* Austria South Korea South Korea Finland Japan Turkey Austria Switzerland* 
Italy* Italy* New Zealand Finland France Czech Republic Spain Japan Austria 
United Kingdom Switzerland* Sweden Austria Denmark Finland Finland Slovenia Canada 
Belgium* Iceland Greece Chile* Sweden Ireland Slovenia Belgium* New Zealand 
Denmark Netherlands Denmark Japan United Kingdom Norway South Korea Portugal Spain 
Portugal Ireland Spain Netherlands Switzerland* Sweden Chile* Ireland Greece 
Czech Republic Greece Australia* Hungary Poland Netherlands Luxembourg Italy* Belgium* 
Turkey New Zealand United Kingdom Germany* Hungary New Zealand Sweden Luxembourg Germany* 
France Portugal Chile* Switzerland* Slovenia Spain Estonia Spain Luxembourg 
Canada Turkey Mexico Poland Estonia United Kingdom Israel United Kingdom Portugal 
Slovakia Finland Ireland Estonia Portugal Chile* Austria South Korea Turkey 
Luxembourg Canada Poland Belgium* Ireland Portugal Belgium* Turkey  
 Chile* Estonia Luxembourg Slovakia Belgium* Ireland Greece  
 Spain Slovakia Portugal Greece Poland Greece Israel  
 Japan  Ireland Australia* Luxembourg Poland Germany*  
 Hungary   South Korea Hungary Italy* Iceland  
 Poland   Mexico Canada    
 South Korea   Japan Denmark    
 Estonia   Chile* Estonia    
 Mexico   Czech Republic Switzerland*    
Accession indicated by italics 
Strong bicameralism indicated by asterisk  
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A1.4: Signature, Succession to Signature, Acceptance, and Approval 
 
1: “Acceptance” by Finland, Japan, and the Netherlands; “Approval” by Czech Republic and Slovakia 
2: Signed by Israel 
3: Signed by Poland; “Acceptance” by Japan and the Netherlands; “Approval” by Slovakia 
4: Signed by Italy and Israel; “Acceptance” by Finland, the Netherlands, and Portugal; “Approval” by France 
5: “Acceptance” by Japan and the Netherlands; “Approval” by Czech Republic, France, and Portugal 
6: “Succession to signature” by Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia 
7: “Succession to signature” by Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia 
8: “Succession to signature” by Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia 
9: “Succession to signature” by Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia 
10: “Acceptance” by the Netherlands; “Succession to signature” by Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia 
11: Signed by Estonia, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, and Poland 
12: “Succession to signature” by Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia 
13: Signed by Israel and Turkey; “Acceptance” by Finland, Japan, the Netherlands, and Norway; “Approval” by France and Portugal 
14: “Succession to signature” by Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia 
15: Signed by Israel; “Acceptance” by the Netherlands 
16: “Succession to signature” by Slovenia 
17: Signed by Czech Republic and Switzerland; “Acceptance” by Japan and the Netherlands; “Approval” by France, Norway, and Portugal 
18: “Acceptance” by Finland and the Netherlands; “Approval” by France, Denmark, and Hungary; “Succession to signature” by Czech Republic and Slovakia 
19: “Acceptance” by the Netherlands; “Approval” by France 
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Appendix 2: Understandings to the Basel Convention 
 
“(1) It is the understanding of the United States of America that, as the Convention does not 
apply to vessel and aircraft that are entitled to sovereign immunity under international law, in 
particular to any warship, naval auxiliary, and other vessels or aircraft owned or operated by a 
State and in use on government, non-commercial service, each state shall ensure that such 
vessels or aircraft act in a manner consistent with this Convention, so far as it practicable and 
reasonable, by adopting appropriate measures that do not impair the operation or operational 
capabilities of sovereign immune vessels. 
(2) It is the understanding of the United States of America that a state is a “transit state” within 
the meaning of the Convention only if wastes are moved, or are planned to be moved, through its 
inland waterways, inland waters, or land territory. 
(3) It is the understanding of the United States of America that an exporting state may decide that 
it lacks the capacity to dispose of wastes in an “environmentally sound and efficient manner” if 
disposal in the importing country would be both environmentally sound and economically 
efficient. 
(4) It is the understanding of the United States of America that Article 9(2) does not create 
obligations for the exporting state with regard to cleanup, beyond taking such wastes back or 
otherwise disposing of them in accordance with the Convention.  Further obligations may be 
determined by the parties pursuant to Article 12. 
Further, at the time the United States of America deposits its instrument of ratification of the 
Basel Convention, the United States will formally object to the declaration of any State which 
asserts the right to require its prior permission or authorization for the passage of vessels 
transporting hazardous wastes while exercising, under international law, its right of innocent 
passage through the territorial sea or freedom of navigation in an exclusive economic zone.”1 
 
 
 
  
                                                             
1 Received by the Secretarial-General from the Government of the United States of America on March 13, 1996, as 
reported in the United Nations Treaty Collection. 
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Sejm of the Republic of Poland.  <http://sejm.gov.pl/english>. 
Senado de España.  <http://www.senado.es>. 
Senate, the Parliament of the Czech Republic.  <http://www.senat.cz>. 
The Senate of Mexico.  <http://www.senat.fr>. 
Senato della Repubblica.  <http://www.senato.it/english/>. 
Solsten, Eric, ed.  Austria: A Country Study.  Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 
1994. 
Stone, Bruce.  Bicameralism and Accountability: Lectures in the Senate Occasional Lecture 
Series.  2002-2003. “Australian Bicameralism: Potential and Performance in State Upper 
Houses.” Department of the Senate.  Canberra, Australia. 2003. 
United Nations Treaty Collection.  <http://treaties.un.org>. 
United States Senate.  <http://senate.gov>. 
United States State Department.  <http://www.state.gov>. 
The White House.  <http://www.whitehouse.gov>. 
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